By each date threshold, what is the probability that another frontier-AI developer (e.g. OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta, xAI, or Mistral) has received a US government order that restricts, suspends, or bars access to one of its DEPLOYED models -- comparable in kind to the Fable/Mythos directive?

rationale:

The June 12, 2026, BIS export-control directive against Anthropic's Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models represents a significant but highly idiosyncratic precedent. The probabilities of a comparable forced order against another frontier-AI developer—12% by end-2026, 20% by mid-2027, and 30% by end-2027—reflect strong near-term non-extension signals balanced against accumulating long-term policy and capability risks.

Anthropic-Specific Drivers vs. Peer Cooperation The Fable/Mythos directive was the first forced offlining of a deployed commercial frontier model via ECRA lawfaremedia.org. However, it was executed as a 'reluctant last resort' csis.org triggered by Anthropic's explicit refusal to patch or pull the models following a severe cyber-jailbreak demonstration lawfaremedia.orgdigg.com. Anthropic is also in a uniquely adversarial position with the administration, engaged in active litigation over a Department of War supply-chain blacklist courtlistener.com.

In contrast, peer labs (OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Microsoft, xAI) are highly cooperative. They have signed voluntary CAISI pre-deployment evaluation agreements hpcwire.comthehill.comcnbc.com, and OpenAI maintains explicit defense partnerships, including the Trusted Access for Cyber program deploymentsafety.openai.comopenai.com. For another lab to receive a comparable coercive order, it would require a severe capability discovery combined with a fundamental breakdown in this default cooperative posture.

Near-Term Outlook (12% by end-2026) The risk for the remainder of 2026 is suppressed by explicit government signaling. Reports indicate that the administration has 'no plans' and is 'unlikely to extend' similar export controls to competitors' models, such as OpenAI's GPT-5.5 lawfaremedia.orglawfaremedia.orgtheinformation.comtheinformation.com. Furthermore, the administration's June 2 Executive Order emphasizes voluntary 'early-look' reviews, explicitly avoiding mandatory licensing whitehouse.govskadden.com. The government is also likely to act cautiously while navigating the legally contested and novel 'deemed export over SaaS access' theory csis.org, pending the outcome of legal challenges.

Accumulating Tail Risks (20% by mid-2027, 30% by end-2027) Despite the near-term friction, the risk compounds steadily through 2027. The precedent for forcing a model offline has been set. Because cyber-jailbreak vulnerabilities are considered inherent to all modern language models csis.org, the surface area for potential enforcement triggers expands rapidly as next-generation models are deployed.

Additionally, the broader policy environment is extremely volatile, with the administration demonstrating a willingness to act aggressively on AI via NSPM-11. If the RASA act (which already passed the House 369-22) clears the Senate, it could formalize and expand the government's statutory authority over remote-access export controls, emboldening further enforcement based purely on model capabilities.

Key Uncertainties These probabilities could prove too low if a severe CBRN or cyber incident occurs on a deployed peer model, compelling emergency government intervention before a lab can voluntarily mitigate it. Conversely, they could prove too high if the Anthropic directive is enjoined or struck down in court—chilling future use of this specific ECRA mechanism—or if peer labs successfully preempt enforcement entirely through self-restriction prior to deployment.