The question asks if fewer than 2% of the global population will experience a greater than 2% wealth/welfare loss due to climate change by 2100. (a) There are approximately 74 years remaining until resolution. (b) The status quo trajectory (2.5–2.9°C of warming) points to widespread, massive economic impacts well beyond 2%. (c) Considering the scope, limiting the affected population to under 2% means 98% of the world must be shielded from even a 2% loss. (d) A 'No' outcome is highly likely becau
The question asks if fewer than 5% of the global population will experience a greater than 2% wealth/welfare loss due to climate change by 2100. (a) About 74 years remain. (b) Current estimates suggest far more than 5% of the population is already locked into significant climate damages, especially in the Global South. (c) A 5% threshold is slightly more lenient but still requires 95% of humanity to face practically zero (<2%) economic harm compared to a counterfactual. (d) A 'No' outcome is ver
This asks if fewer than 10% of the global population will experience >2% climate-attributable wealth/welfare loss by 2100. (a) Time to resolution is nearly 74 years. (b) Current policies strongly indicate broad economic disruption, as 77% of countries are projected to be poorer than in a no-climate-change counterfactual news.stanford.edu. (c) Expanding the allowed impacted population to 10% gives more room for error, but still demands an extraordinarily optimistic outcome where 90% of the world is shield
This asks whether fewer than 15% of the global population will face >2% wealth/welfare loss by 2100. (a) There are roughly 74 years left. (b) The status quo involves 2.5–2.9°C of warming, with widespread extreme weather and productivity drops. (c) At a 15% threshold, 85% of humanity must have their losses contained to <2%. While this is the easiest threshold in this batch, it remains highly unlikely. (d) A 'No' resolution is strongly favored because over 22-39% of the global population could be
The world is currently on track for 2.5-2.9°C of warming by 2100. Recent empirical models project global average GDP losses of 16-30% or more, with damages heavily concentrated in the Global South. Given that Africa and Asia will house the vast majority of the global population, the probability that fewer than 20% of the world experiences a greater than 2% economic or welfare loss is extremely low. Even current estimates suggest population-weighted global GDP losses already exceed 6%. Only a com
With global population growth centered in the most climate-vulnerable tropical and subtropical regions, a significant majority of humanity will be exposed to severe climate impacts. Projections indicate 22-39% of the population could be pushed entirely outside the optimal 'human climate niche.' Even conservative economic models projecting modest global aggregate damages of 2-3% mask immense regional inequality, implying much larger relative losses for the majority of the population in hotter cli
Estimates of global climate-induced GDP losses consistently exceed the 2% threshold, and these impacts are highly regressive. Over 40% of the world's countries—representing an even larger share of the global population—are projected to be poorer in absolute terms relative to a no-climate-change counterfactual. To keep the population experiencing >2% loss under the 40% mark, the world would need near-perfect adaptation strategies and massive global wealth transfers that currently seem politically
For fewer than 50% of the global population to experience a wealth/welfare loss of >2%, the median global citizen must be insulated from the worst climate damages. However, given that ~67% of the 2100 population is projected to live in highly vulnerable regions (Africa and Asia), and consensus empirical models project 15-30% average global GDP losses, the median person is highly likely to exceed a 2% loss. While technological decoupling, robust urbanization, and geoengineering offer a plausible
By 2100, the vast majority of the global population will reside in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which are projected by recent econometric models (like NGFS and Bilal & Känzig) to face severe climate-induced GDP losses, often exceeding 20-30%. For this question to resolve YES, the number of people experiencing greater than 2% loss must be kept below 65% of the population. Given demographic trends, this would require either massive, rapid decarbonization and flawless adaptation,
This question resolves YES if fewer than 80% of the global population experiences a wealth loss greater than 2%. This is a more forgiving threshold than the 65% mark. If wealthy, temperate regions (like North America, Europe, and parts of East Asia)—which may collectively house around 20-25% of the 2100 population—manage to leverage adaptation, wealth, and favorable geographies to keep their relative climate losses below 2%, this question could resolve YES even under standard IAM projections (e.
With about 27,206 days remaining, the status-quo outcome is strongly NO: under current-policy warming, it seems very unlikely that fewer than 2% of people will end up above a 5% climate-attributable wealth or welfare loss 2 sources. Scope is crucial here too: under a narrow GDP-only lens, some rich temperate countries may stay below 5%, but this question only needs a tiny exposed minority to fail, and a few populous South Asian or African states could already bust the 2% cap. Mortality-we
The horizon is still about 27,206 days, and the status quo is again NO, though this is a bit more permissive than the 2% population version because the cap is 5% rather than 2% 2 sources. Considering scope: a narrow GDP-only assessment could perhaps confine >5% losses to a relatively small tail, but a population-weighted welfare assessment likely puts well more than 5% of humanity above that threshold because end-century population growth is concentrated in hot, vulnerable regions [ce82b1
About 74.5 years remain (27,206 days). If nothing materially changed, the status quo path is a NO: current policies still point to roughly 2.5-2.9°C warming, and multiple assessments project large welfare/income losses concentrated in hot, populous regions 44 sources. On the very strict <10% scope, this looks especially hard because Africa plus vulnerable parts of South and Southeast Asia likely account for well above 10% of humanity, and several studies project these regio
About 74.5 years remain, and the status quo is still NO under current-policy warming near 2.7°C climateanalytics.org. Widening the threshold from 10% to 15% helps, but not by much: the strongest NO case is still that credible assessments increasingly put large shares of Africa and South/Southeast Asia over a 5% welfare/income loss, while Africa alone may reach roughly 38% of world population by 2100 3 sources. The YES path is that adaptation, migration, technology, and convergence mak
Limiting the >5% economic damage to fewer than 20% of the global population still requires safeguarding over 80% of humanity from what is historically a very small drag on long-term GDP. Under current policies, models predict that large portions of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will experience peak GDP impacts far exceeding 5%. The strongest argument for a YES is that current 'top-down' models heavily underestimate human adaptation and overestimate the 'social cost of carbon' by failing to acc
This is the most lenient of the four thresholds, requiring that we keep >5% wealth/welfare losses restricted to fewer than 30% of the global population. This means up to 29.9% of the world can suffer major economic damage without triggering a NO. While this is mathematically much more plausible than the 10% threshold, it still requires that more than 70% of the 2100 population experiences less than 5% damage. Given that Africa and Asia alone are projected to hold over 80% of the global populatio
To resolve YES, fewer than 40% of the world's population must experience a >5% wealth/welfare loss relative to a no-climate-change counterfactual. Given that Africa and Asia will constitute roughly 80% of the global population by 2100, and empirical models (e.g., Burke et al.) consistently project that tropical and subtropical regions will experience the most severe economic damages (often well above 10-20%), the likelihood of keeping the 'highly affected' population under 40% is very small. A Y
Time left is about 74 years. The status quo still leans NO: current warming trajectories remain around 2.3-2.9°C 2 sources, and the bottom 50% of the world population is expected to bear 75% of relative income losses from climate change wid.world. By 2100, Africa and Asia together are projected to account for roughly 83% of humanity nature.com, so on the population-weighted scope this is much harder than a simple global-average damage number suggests. NO is plausible because Africa plus the
(a) With 74 years left, long-term economic trends are highly uncertain. (b) The status quo indicates unequal damage distributions, heavily skewing toward tropical regions. (c) Considering different scopes, a YES outcome requires at least 35% of the population to experience less than 5% loss. This aligns with the projected population of the Global North, China, and temperate regions by 2100. (d) A NO outcome is still favored by recent empirical models (e.g., Bilal & Känzig) that project even high
(a) Time remaining is 74 years. (b) The baseline assumption is substantial global warming but highly localized resilience. (c) By answering this with a broader scope, for a YES to occur, at least 20% of the global population must keep their wealth loss below 5%. (d) A NO outcome would require the most pessimistic empirical models to be entirely accurate, meaning that adaptation costs, trade failures, and tipping points drag even the richest nations past a 5% loss. (e) A YES outcome is the most l
Before answering, I considered the following: (a) There are about 74 years left until the outcome is known. (b) The status quo is a trajectory of ~2.6°C warming, which consensus models suggest will cause >10% economic loss for a vast majority of the global population. (c) Even if aggregate global GDP is somewhat resilient, severe regional inequalities guarantee many heavily affected losers. (d) A NO outcome is overwhelmingly likely because highly vulnerable populations, such as those in low-lyin
Before answering, I considered the following: (a) There are about 74 years remaining. (b) The status quo points to significant climate damages for the poorest half of the world under current emission pathways. (c) At a 5% threshold, even if major regions like Africa and India miraculously adapt, the most vulnerable coastal populations and agricultural workers would likely still exceed this population mark. (d) The NO outcome is heavily favored by consensus economic models projecting 20-30% globa
Before answering, I considered the following: (a) There are about 74 years remaining until 2100. (b) The climate trajectory of 2.6°C implies heavy regional economic losses. (c) 10% of the global population roughly matches the population currently living in highly vulnerable low-lying coastal zones (~11%). (d) Resolving NO is highly likely because if either coastal populations or populations in extreme heat regions in the Global South suffer >10% loss, the 10% population threshold is easily excee
Before answering, I considered the following: (a) There are roughly 74 years remaining. (b) The status quo involves >50% of the global population residing in regions (like Africa and South Asia) projected to suffer double-digit income losses by 2100. (c) While 15% is a larger threshold, it still requires the vast majority of the developing world to avoid a 10% wealth loss relative to counterfactuals. (d) Given Africa alone will be ~38% of the global population by 2100, widespread damage there al
With over 74 years until resolution (2100), the outcome depends on the divergence between economic assessment models. The 'NO' case is strongly supported by growth-effect macroeconomic models (like Burke et al. and Metaculus consensus at 16.5% global GDP loss) which suggest deep, compounding damages heavily concentrated in the Global South. Given that Africa and Asia will constitute ~85% of the 2100 population, these models imply that far more than 20% of the world will experience >10% wealth lo
At the 30% population threshold, the dynamics remain similar but offer a slightly larger buffer for regional resilience. Even under moderate integrated assessment models (IAMs) that project a global GDP loss of around 4-5%, the unequal distribution of impacts means the poorest 40-50% of countries (representing a massive population share) could still cross the 10% individual loss threshold. However, if rapid economic convergence allows middle-income countries in Asia to adapt effectively, the pro
The 40% threshold approaches the projected population share of Africa alone by 2100 (~38-40%). If severe damages (>10% loss) are mostly contained to Africa and parts of South Asia, while East Asia, the Americas, and Europe successfully decouple their economic growth from climate hazards through technological adaptation, the global total could feasibly stay under 40%. The probability increases more significantly here because even in some higher-damage models, the 'winners' or 'near-neutral' popul
For the 50% threshold, we reach a tipping point in the bet: will the absolute majority of humanity lose more than 10% of their wealth relative to a counterfactual? While high-damage models say yes, the counteracting forces of long-term economic growth and adaptation are powerful. If India and China (making up a huge portion of Asia's 45% projected 2100 population) manage to limit their relative climate damages to under 10% through aggressive infrastructure and cooling investments, then keeping t
Resolving YES requires that fewer than 65% of the global population experiences a wealth/welfare loss of more than 10%. By 2100, regions highly vulnerable to severe climate impacts (like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) will account for over 60% of the global population. Under current warming trajectories (~2.7°C), median damage models project severe losses in these regions. However, advanced adaptation-inclusive models, economic convergence, or disruptive technological advancements (e.g., AGI
Resolving YES requires that fewer than 80% of the population experiences >10% loss (meaning at least 20% of the world stays below the 10% loss threshold). It is highly plausible that 20% of the global population—comprising residents of temperate, developed nations (e.g., North America, Europe, parts of East Asia) and the most affluent demographics globally—will possess the resources and geographic advantages to limit their relative economic losses to single digits. Therefore, this question has a
There are about 74.5 years left, but the bar here is extremely strict: YES requires fewer than 2% of the global population to suffer climate-attributable losses above 15% by 2100. The status quo is NO by a wide margin. Even current observed population-weighted losses are already around 14.1% in Southeast Asia and 11.2% in Southern Africa as of 2022 udel.edu, and under current-policy warming roughly 22%-39% of humanity may be pushed outside the human climate niche by 2100 nature.com. On a global-av
About 74.5 years remain. If nothing major improved beyond the current policy/adaptation trajectory, the status quo is still NO: warming near 2.6C-2.9C with very unequal regional damages makes it hard to believe that fewer than 5% of people will exceed a 15% loss 2 sources. Looking at different scopes: globally, there is genuine uncertainty because some models are much milder 2 sources while others project severe losses 2 sources; but on the specific population-share scope, 5
The outcome depends on whether climate-attributable wealth/welfare losses can be kept under 15% for at least 90% of the global population by 2100. Current trajectories suggest 2.5-2.9°C of warming, with modern macroeconomic models (e.g., Burke et al., Bilal & Känzig) projecting global average income losses of 20-30% or higher. These damages are projected to be disproportionately concentrated in tropical and developing regions (like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia), which will likely account fo
This question asks if severe (>15%) climate-induced economic losses can be limited to fewer than 15% of the global population. As established, highly populated regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are projected to face the steepest welfare reductions, often exceeding 20% in high-impact econometric models. Africa alone is projected to host around 40% of the global population by 2100. Unless climate damages are far more geographically isolated or globally less severe than recent asses
Here, the threshold is whether fewer than 20% of the global population experiences a >15% economic loss. While this provides more buffer for regional damages, demographic realities remain a significant hurdle. With up to 40% of the projected 2100 population living in contexts that the IPCC currently deems 'highly vulnerable,' exceeding this threshold is still the base case scenario under a 2.5-2.9°C warming trajectory. A 'YES' resolution would likely require global growth to aggressively decoupl
Limiting the >15% economic loss to fewer than 30% of the global population offers the highest probability among the four scenarios. Even so, with median global average income reductions projected by leading models at ~23% or more, a significant majority of the global population could easily experience losses beyond the 15% mark. If Africa and South Asia (together comprising over 55% of the 2100 population) suffer uniformly high damages, this 30% threshold will still be breached. Nevertheless, th
About 27,206 days (~74.5 years) remain. If nothing materially changes, the status quo looks like NO: current-policy warming around 2.5-2.9°C plus the recent shift toward higher damage estimates implies large, unequal losses, with newer assessments showing roughly 23-46% global output/welfare damage and especially severe impacts in Africa and Asia 55 sources. Scope-checking against the other thresholds, keeping the >15%-loss share below 40% is much harder than keepin
About 27,206 days remain. The status quo is still NO under current-policy warming, since the Metaculus median for total climate GDP damage by 2100 is already about 16.5%, and the losses are expected to be regressive, with the bottom 50% of people bearing about 75% of relative income losses 2 sources. Compared with the 40% version, this wider scope gives the YES side more room: if future credible assessments settle nearer moderate-damage, adaptation-rich views, the affected share could pla
About 27,206 days remain. This threshold is near the center of my uncertainty: if nothing changed, current-policy warming and newer macro damage functions would still point to NO or at least a very close call, because global losses in the 23-46% range with strong tropical concentration could push the >15%-loss share well above half 3 sources. Looking across scopes, <65% is much more achievable than <40% or <50%, since many richer temperate populations may stay below 15%, and some
About 27,206 days remain. This is the easiest of the four thresholds, so scope-checking matters: I can be bearish on the 40%, 50%, and even 65% versions while still making YES the favorite here. The status quo under current policies is still not comfortably YES, because newer NGFS/Bilal-style assessments plus demographic concentration in Africa and Asia make even an >80% affected share plausible 44 sources. Still, to get NO here, losses above 15% must extend to nearly the w
(a) Time left: ~74 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: Current trajectories (2.5-3°C) and newer top-down macroeconomic models project highly unequal, severe relative wealth losses for developing nations. (c) Scopes: The 2% threshold implies that >98% of the world avoids a 20% loss relative to a no-climate-change counterfactual, an incredibly strict condition. (d) Why NO: The V20 group alone (17-20% of the current global population) is already estimated to have lost ~20% of their wealth v-20.org. F
(a) Time left: ~74 years (until 2100). (b) Status quo: Under current 2.5-2.9°C warming pathways, empirical models suggest that major populations in the Global South will face steep relative GDP declines. (c) Scopes: A 5% limit would require >95% of humanity to experience less than a 20% loss, leaving almost no room for systemic impacts in populous developing regions. (d) Why NO: Research web.stanford.edu indicates that the poorest 40% of countries could see average income declines of 75% relative to the
(a) Time left: ~74 years (until end of 2100). (b) Status quo: Without radical shifts in emissions or adaptation, a large portion of the developing world is on track to suffer >20% relative economic damages. (c) Scopes: A 10% threshold allows for some vulnerable pockets (like small island states) to suffer extreme losses, but still requires the vast majority of Asia and Africa to remain largely unscathed relative to their baseline potential. (d) Why NO: Top-down economic estimates lse.ac.uk projec
(a) Time left: 74 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: Climate models and macroeconomic assessments project massive, unequal economic damages concentrated in tropical/subtropical nations. (c) Scopes: The 15% threshold is the most lenient among this batch, but still requires 85% of the global population to avoid a 20% relative loss. (d) Why NO: The V20 group already represents >17% of the global population and has sustained estimated wealth losses near 20% v-20.org. With the ADB projecting massive l
(a) ~74 years left until resolution. (b) Status quo: 2.5-2.9°C warming, with recent econometric models (like Burke et al.) predicting devastating economic impacts for the tropics. (c) Considering the geographic scope, high damages are concentrated exactly where population growth will be highest (Africa and India). (d) A NO outcome is highly likely because Africa and India alone will represent ~40% of the global population and face the highest relative temperature shocks, almost certainly pushing
The resolution criteria asks if fewer than 30% of the global population will experience >20% wealth loss. Africa alone is projected to represent nearly 40% of the global population by 2100, and is routinely assessed by modern top-down economic models to face GDP per capita damages far exceeding 20% under current warming trajectories (~2.5°C). Therefore, successfully keeping the heavily impacted population under 30% remains unlikely, though slightly more feasible than the 20% threshold if rapid g
The resolution criteria asks if fewer than 40% of the global population will experience >20% wealth loss. The IPCC currently identifies over 40% of the current global population as 'highly vulnerable' to climate change, and demographic shifts will concentrate even more people in these tropical and subtropical zones by 2100. Avoiding this threshold would require either moderate climate damages (e.g., consensus reverting to older, more conservative models that project low global damages) or highly
The resolution criteria asks if fewer than 50% of the global population will experience >20% wealth loss. This is the most plausible threshold to avoid, as it only requires that half the world's population experiences less than 20% relative loss. Developed nations, higher latitudes, and middle-income regions that successfully adapt could collectively represent about half the population. However, given that the poorest and most vulnerable nations will constitute a majority of the 2100 population,
With about 27,206 days (roughly 74.5 years) left, the status quo is a current-policy warming path of about 2.5-2.9 C by 2100 2 sources. At the broad global-average scope, that is somewhat favorable for YES: Metaculus centers total damage around 16.5% of world GDP metaculus.com, and a recent Climate Impact Lab estimate puts the median person's loss at just 1.1% bfi.uchicago.edu. But at the population-weighted scope relevant here, the fastest-growing regions are also the most climate-vulnerable, especia
Same time horizon and status quo: roughly 2.5-2.9 C under current policies 2 sources. The key scope check is that this is materially easier than the 65% version: to get a NO, more than four-fifths of humanity must end up above a 20% loss, which usually requires damage to extend well beyond the tropical poor and into most temperate or high-income populations. That is possible in the Bilal-Kanzig or NGFS style models 2 sources, but many credible estimates are lower, including the 16.
A 30% permanent loss relative to a counterfactual baseline is equivalent to a Great Depression-scale shock. However, 2% of the projected 2100 global population is only around 200 million people. Given the extreme geographic inequality of climate impacts, it is overwhelmingly likely that at least 200 million people living in the absolute hottest, most vulnerable, and least adaptable areas (e.g., parts of the Sahel or highly exposed low-lying regions) will experience a >30% growth drag over the ne
With roughly 74.5 years left until resolution, a YES outcome requires that fewer than 5% of the global population experiences >30% economic loss. While slightly more permissive than the 2% threshold, this still demands an incredibly successful global adaptation effort where virtually no major populated region suffers catastrophic growth hits. High-vulnerability contexts currently house nearly half the global population, and institutional assessments like NGFS project that entire hot/arid nations
a) Time left: Approximately 27,206 days (about 74 years) until 2100. b) Status quo: Under current policies, warming is projected to hit 2.5-2.9°C, and standard economic models (like BHM 2015 and NGFS Phase 5) project global damages around 30% of GDP, with highly unequal distribution. Highly vulnerable regions (like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia), which will hold over 40% of the global population, are projected to face >40-75% income losses. c) Scopes: We must consider different paradigms, su
a) Time left: ~74 years until 2100. b) Status quo: At 2.5-2.9°C warming, global GDP losses are heavily skewed toward the Global South, meaning the bottom 40-50% of the population will bear the vast majority of relative losses. c) Scopes: By broadening our view to adaptation and mitigation, there is a chance the world transitions rapidly, capping warming at ~2°C, which would limit the severity of regional GDP losses. d) A NO outcome remains very likely as the 15% threshold is still extremely low.
a) Time left: ~74 years. b) Status quo: Unmitigated or partially mitigated climate change disproportionately hits the poorest populations, which account for well over 20% of the world. c) Scopes: We must consider demographic shifts. If population growth in vulnerable areas is lower than projected, or if climate migration redistributes the population to safer latitudes, the percentage of people suffering extreme local losses could decrease. d) A NO outcome is still the baseline. With the UN proje
a) Time left: ~74 years. b) Status quo: Under current estimates, the 'bottom 50%' of the population is most at risk. If 50% are at risk, limiting the damage to less than 30% of the population requires either saving a large portion of that at-risk group or the models being significantly too pessimistic. c) Scopes: The 30% threshold provides the largest margin of error. It allows for the possibility that the absolute poorest 25% of the world suffer extreme losses, but the rest (including many midd
With roughly 74 years until 2100, current policies put the world on track for 2.5–2.9°C of warming. The status quo in econometric modeling increasingly incorporates 'growth effects,' where climate damages compound over time. By 2100, the global population will be heavily concentrated in Africa and Asia, regions most vulnerable to climate impacts. A NO outcome is likely because models like Burke et al. (2015) estimate the poorest 40% of countries could face up to a 75% income reduction relative t
With about 74 years to 2100, the trajectory of 2.5-2.9°C warming presents immense economic risks. The status quo demographic shift implies that well over half the global population will reside in the hottest and most vulnerable regions (Africa and South Asia). If high-damage models accurately capture long-term growth penalties, these regions could easily see >30% losses, strongly pointing toward a NO. Conversely, a YES outcome is supported by the fact that if global average loss estimates sit ar
a) Time left: ~74 years. b) Status quo: Current trajectories suggest significant warming, but global wealth will still be higher in absolute terms by 2100. c) Scopes: A 65% threshold provides a much larger buffer. For this to resolve NO, severe (>30%) losses must extend well beyond the poorest nations and deeply into middle-income and rapidly developing economies like China and India. d) NO reasoning: If climate tipping points are breached, leading to >3°C of warming, cascading failures in globa
a) Time left: ~74 years. b) Status quo: Global warming continues, but so does technological adaptation and economic growth. c) Scopes: At an 80% threshold, a NO resolution would mean that over 80% of the global population experiences a >30% loss in wealth/welfare relative to a counterfactual. d) NO reasoning: Only worst-case warming scenarios combined with the most pessimistic, unmitigated growth-damage models (which remain controversial in standard economics) would push more than 80% of humanit
With over 74 years remaining until 2100, current trajectories point to 2.5–2.9°C of global warming. The core uncertainty is whether climate impacts represent a permanent drag on economic growth rates (as suggested by Burke et al., 2015, and Bilal & Känzig, 2024) or a temporary hit to output levels (as suggested by Newell et al., 2021, and DICE-2023). Under growth-effect models, global average losses could reach 25–46%, heavily concentrated in the tropics. Even if more optimistic level-effect mod
With 74 years until resolution, keeping the fraction of the global population experiencing >40% wealth/welfare losses below 5% requires both significant adaptation success and for the lower-end 'level-effect' economic damage models to be proven right. By 2100, the most thermally vulnerable regions (such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) will house a significantly larger share of the world's population. A 5% threshold allows roughly 500 million people to experience catastrophic relative losse
(a) Time left: 74 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: Trajectories suggest ~2.7°C of warming, with damages highly concentrated in vulnerable regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. (c) Scopes: 10% of the projected 2100 population represents around 1 billion people. (d) Reason for NO: Sub-Saharan Africa alone will house roughly 35-40% of humanity by 2100. If empirical growth-effect models (which project >75% income reductions for the poorest countries) are accurate, well over 10% of the glo
(a) Time left: Approximately 74 years. (b) Status quo: Current policies lead to 2.5-2.9°C warming. (c) Scopes: A 15% threshold represents ~1.5 billion people by 2100. (d) Reason for NO: Given the 'climate-inequality trap,' the bottom 50% faces roughly 75% of relative income losses. Even moderate aggregate global damages will mathematically necessitate extreme tail-end losses (>40%) for the most vulnerable quintiles. (e) Reason for YES: This outcome is entirely plausible if pessimistic growth-eff
By 2100, the populations of highly vulnerable regions (primarily Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) will represent a significant majority of the global population. Current climate economics literature is split between 'compounding growth effect' models (which project devastating >50% losses for the Global South) and 'level effect/convergence' models (which project global losses under 10%). Given that even moderate models predict substantial losses in hot and arid countries, the likelihood that f
(a) About 74 years remain until resolution. (b) The world is tracking toward 2.5-2.9°C warming, bringing severe but unequally distributed economic damages. (c) By 2100, the most vulnerable tropical and arid zones will house an expanding share of humanity. (d) A 'NO' outcome is plausible given that NGFS scenarios warn of >45% GDP losses for 'hot and arid' nations, and when combining populations of heavily affected regions in Africa and the Middle East, reaching 30% of the global population is a r
(a) 74 years remain. (b) Baseline warming of ~2.7°C presents massive adaptation challenges, but baseline economic growth over 75 years is also expected to be massive. (c) By 2100, a 40% loss in relative wealth means an economy is deeply scarred but likely still richer than today due to general economic convergence. (d) For a 'NO' outcome to occur, the >40% loss threshold must sweep across more than 40% of the global population, implying that almost the entirety of Africa and parts of South Asia
(a) 74 years until 2100. (b) Continuing current emission trends implies serious climate disruption, but human adaptation and baseline economic growth will dynamically interact with these shocks. (c) A >40% loss for >50% of the global population would mean that the majority of humanity experiences a near-collapse in relative economic potential. (d) A 'NO' outcome rests almost entirely on the highest-sensitivity models (like Bilal & Känzig 2024, projecting 46% average global GDP loss) being proven
There are about 27,206 days (~74.5 years) left. If little changes from the current path, the status quo is roughly 2.5-2.9°C warming by 2100 under current policies nber.org read.oecd-ilibrary.org. I check this at two scopes. At the global-average scope, having 65% of humanity each lose >40% is an extremely severe outcome, and the current community baseline for total world GDP loss is much lower, around 16.5% by 2100 metaculus.com, which points toward YES. At the distributional scope, though, Africa and Asia are ex
This question requires that the >40% loss population is kept below 80% of the global total. This is a very achievable threshold for humanity. Because the Global North (US, Europe, China, Russia) is projected to make up roughly 20% of the world's population by 2100 and will likely suffer significantly smaller economic damages (or even gains in some older models), the proportion of the world suffering catastrophic >40% losses is unlikely to exceed 80%. For a NO resolution, almost the entire develo
This strict threshold asks if the population experiencing >50% counterfactual loss will be kept below 2% of the world (roughly 200 million people out of a projected 10.4 billion). Counterfactual losses are driven by compounding growth drags; a mere 1% reduction in annual GDP growth over 75 years mathematically results in a >50% relative loss. Given the extreme climate vulnerability of regions like the Sahel, small island states, and parts of South Asia, it is almost certain that at least 200 mil
This question asks if the >50% loss population can be kept below 5% of the global total (roughly 500 million people). While slightly more forgiving than the 2% threshold, keeping the severely impacted population this small remains incredibly difficult. The poorest 40% of countries are projected to face massive income reductions under unmitigated scenarios. Even if we factor in a ~35% chance that the 'moderate damage' paradigm (DICE) proves correct and adaptation is highly successful, the tail-en
(a) Time left: Approximately 74.5 years (resolution in 2100). (b) Status quo: Economists currently disagree on the magnitude of climate damages. Some models (like DICE) project low single-digit GDP losses, while newer econometric models (like Burke et al. and Bilal & Känzig) project >50% counterfactual losses for large swaths of the global south. (c) Scope: The outcome depends heavily on whether temperature increases affect economic growth rates (leading to massive compounded losses) or just eco
(a) Time left: ~74.5 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: There is an active debate between high-damage econometric projections and lower-damage integrated assessment models. (c) Scope: Moving the threshold to 15% of the population provides slightly more leeway. It allows for some smaller vulnerable regions to experience catastrophic (>50%) counterfactual losses without failing the condition, as long as the largest population centers (like the entirety of India or Sub-Saharan Africa) do not all cro
There are about 74.5 years left. If the world simply follows something like today’s policy path, expected warming is still around 2.5-2.9°C 2 sources; that is dangerous, but whether it translates into >50% welfare losses for one-fifth of humanity is more finely balanced. Across the four related questions, this 20% threshold is close to my internal midpoint. A NO outcome remains quite live because some influential empirical papers imply very severe losses in hot, poor regions [b51ec9, 4c58
About 74.5 years remain until we know the answer. The status quo is still warming around 2.5-2.9°C by 2100 2 sources, so a NO outcome cannot be dismissed; but relative to the stricter thresholds, <30% affected is materially easier to satisfy. Looking across all four scopes, my implied distribution leaves meaningful tail risk above 30%, but not the median case. The strongest NO argument is that several high-damage assessments imply losses large enough to engulf much of the Global South, an
(a) ~74 years remaining until resolution. (b) Traditional IAMs project global economic losses under 15%, but newer empirical models project >50% aggregate losses. (c) The poorest 40% of the global population is heavily concentrated in the most vulnerable tropical and subtropical regions. (d) A NO outcome is quite possible if compounding growth damages (as modeled by Burke et al. or Bilal & Känzig) hold true, meaning the most exposed 40% easily exceed the 50% loss mark relative to the counterfact
(a) ~74 years left until resolution. (b) The median global aggregate damage models diverge wildly between ~10% and ~52% loss. (c) Expanding the threshold to 50% of the global population gives a significantly wider buffer for a YES resolution. (d) A NO outcome requires that not just the poorest and most vulnerable, but half the world's population suffers >50% wealth loss. This demands severe and unmitigated climate damages affecting even middle-income populations. (e) YES is increasingly favored
(a) ~74 years remaining. (b) To reach a >50% relative loss for 65% of the global population, damages must be systemic and globally catastrophic. (c) At this scope, large swaths of major economies in Asia and parts of the Global North would need to be dragged into >50% losses. (d) NO remains a tail-risk possibility if Earth system tipping points (like ice sheet or AMOC collapse) trigger cascading global crises that outpace any capacity for adaptation. (e) YES is highly likely because keeping the
(a) ~74 years to resolution. (b) The historical base rate for unmitigated >50% global aggregate output loss is roughly 12%. (c) For 80% of the world to suffer >50% individual losses, nearly the entire planet outside of the wealthiest temperate pockets must be economically devastated relative to the counterfactual. (d) A NO is only plausible in the most extreme, low-probability tail-risk scenarios (e.g., severe >3.5C warming combined with persistent, unadaptable growth-rate destruction). (e) YES
(a) There are approximately 27,206 days (about 74 years) left until the outcome is known in 2100. (b) The status quo trajectory is 2.5-2.9 degrees C of warming. Current economic projections are highly divided, with some showing manageable global impacts and others projecting massive compounding losses for the poorest nations. (c) Considering different scopes, a 65% loss relative to a counterfactual is a catastrophic hit to welfare. However, on a regional scope, small island nations, coastal regi
(a) There are approximately 27,206 days (about 74 years) left until the outcome is known in 2100. (b) The status quo trajectory is 2.5-2.9 degrees C of warming. Economic models are split on the magnitude of compounding growth drags versus temporary level effects. (c) At different scopes, while a global 65% relative loss is unlikely, regional failures could be massive. (d) A NO outcome means more than 5% of the population (approx 500 million people) experiences >65% loss. This is entirely plausib
(a) There are approximately 27,206 days (about 74 years) left until the outcome is known in 2100. (b) The status quo points to 2.5-2.9 degrees C warming with highly unequal regional impacts. (c) A 65% relative loss is historically seen only in severe crises. Scaling this to 10% of humanity changes the scope from a regional tragedy to a massive continental drag. (d) A NO outcome means more than 10% (approx 1 billion people) suffer >65% relative loss. This could happen if current highly pessimisti
About 27,206 days remain. If nothing materially changed from the broad status quo view today, I think this 15% version would lean YES: exceeding the threshold would mean around 1.5 billion people suffer >65% climate-attributable wealth or welfare losses by 2100, which implies very widespread collapse across multiple mega-regions rather than merely severe inequality. Looking across scopes, this is clearly the easiest YES of the four. The main NO route is that the harsher empirical growth-damage l
The resolution of this question hinges on the percentage of the global population experiencing >65% wealth/welfare loss relative to a no-climate-change counterfactual. Current demographic projections indicate that tropical and subtropical regions (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia) will house roughly 40-50% of the global population by 2100. Economic models, particularly 'growth' models like Burke et al. (2015) and recent updates by Bilal & Känzig (2024), project that these specific regions wi
For the >65% loss to be limited to fewer than 30% of the global population, we must assume that either the most severe economic models overestimate damages, or that substantial adaptation occurs in the developing world. Sub-Saharan Africa alone is projected to account for nearly 38% of the global population by 2100. If that entire region suffers the 75%+ losses projected by World Inequality Lab and Burke et al., this 30% threshold will be breached. However, it is plausible that adaptation varies
At the 40% population threshold, a NO resolution would require almost the entirety of the highly vulnerable tropical and subtropical populations (Africa and large parts of South Asia) to simultaneously cross the extreme 65% wealth loss mark. While worst-case models (Bilal & Känzig 2024, Kotz et al. 2024) suggest this is possible, the 75-year timeframe provides a massive window for technological adaptation, migration, and economic diversification. Furthermore, middle-income nations in these regio
For this question to resolve NO, more than half of the global population must experience a climate-attributable wealth loss exceeding 65%. Given that the bottom 50% of the global population by income is heavily concentrated in the most climate-vulnerable zones, this is the 'worst-case but plausible' scenario under unmitigated warming and zero adaptation. However, breaching the 50% population mark would likely require extreme damages to spill over into wealthier or more temperate middle-income co
(a) Time left: ~74 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: Global emissions trajectory points toward 2.5-2.9°C of warming, with deeply unequal regional economic impacts nature.com. (c) Scope: The question asks if fewer than 65% of the global population will suffer >65% wealth/welfare losses. This requires a vast majority of humanity to experience extreme economic devastation. (d) No likely: If high-damage "growth effect" empirical models prove accurate, the poorest 40-50% of countries could face avera
(a) Time left: ~74 years until 2100. (b) Status quo: High inequality in climate vulnerability, with the Global South bearing the brunt wid.world. (c) Scope: Will fewer than 80% of the world suffer >65% loss? (d) No likely: A NO resolution would require an apocalyptic scenario where virtually the entire planet, including the highly adapted and temperate Global North, suffers >65% losses. (e) Yes likely: Advanced economies (US, Europe, East Asia) represent over 20% of the current and projected gl
This question asks if humanity will limit the population suffering >80% loss to fewer than 2% (approx. 200 million people by 2100). A NO resolution occurs if at least 2% of the population exceeds the 80% loss mark. Current projections show 2-5% of the global population is highly exposed to severe coastal inundation alone, which destroys nearly 100% of localized immovable wealth. Furthermore, with models projecting average income losses of 75% for the poorest 40% of countries, it is extremely lik
This asks whether the population suffering >80% loss will be kept under 5% (approx. 500 million people). While 5% is a higher bar to breach than 2%, deep intra-country inequality and the compounding nature of climate shocks in the Global South make it highly likely that >5% of the population will cross the 80% loss threshold. A YES resolution relies heavily on optimistic, mainstream IAMs (which forecast small global damages) being entirely correct, combined with highly effective, deeply funded g
The resolution of this question depends heavily on the long-standing debate between 'level-effect' and 'growth-effect' economic models of climate damage. If conventional integrated assessment models (IAMs) are correct, global losses will be modest, and practically 0% of the global population will experience an 80% wealth loss relative to a no-climate-change counterfactual, resulting in a YES. However, empirical studies like Burke et al. (2015) and Bilal & Känzig (2024) argue that warming creates
As the threshold increases to 15%, there is more room for highly vulnerable micro-regions or smaller developing nations to experience catastrophic >80% wealth losses without triggering a NO resolution. To exceed 15% of the global population, the damage would almost certainly have to envelop entire massive nations like India or large swathes of the African continent simultaneously. While 'growth-effect' models suggest this is possible, human adaptation (e.g., technological decoupling via heat-res
For the >80% loss population to exceed 20% of the global population by 2100, the compounding economic damages would need to be catastrophic across multiple billions of people. Given the current trajectory of 2.5–2.9°C warming, extreme outlier scenarios (like RCP 8.5) that previously drove the worst GDP projections are increasingly unlikely. Even in Bilal & Känzig's severe 3°C assessment, global average losses are estimated at 46%—meaning an 80% loss is still a tail risk for the absolute worst-hi
At a 30% population threshold, a NO resolution would require a near-complete failure of global adaptation and the unquestioned realization of the most pessimistic 'growth-effect' damage functions across nearly the entirety of the developing tropics. This would effectively mean that one-third of the human race is roughly five times poorer than they would have been otherwise, implying continuous, unmitigated economic stagnation for 80 years. Given historical baselines for capital resilience and te
The resolution criteria ask whether the population experiencing >80% wealth/welfare loss will be fewer than 40%. An 80% relative loss is extremely severe; it requires climate change to nearly wipe out 75 years of expected economic growth. While pessimistic models (e.g., BHM 2015) projected losses near this threshold for the poorest 40% of countries under extreme warming (RCP 8.5), current policies project 2.5-2.9°C warming. Newer empirical models (like Nath et al. 2025) estimate significantly lo
The resolution criteria ask whether the population experiencing >80% wealth/welfare loss will be fewer than 50%. For more than half the world to suffer an 80% relative wealth loss, the catastrophic damages would have to extend beyond the most vulnerable tropical regions and deeply impact the broader developing world. Given human capacity for adaptation, technological progress, and current emission trajectories avoiding worst-case warming, this level of widespread destruction is highly unlikely,
There are 27,206 days left, and the status quo outcome is comfortably YES. Scope check: for this to resolve NO, credible assessments by 2100 would need to say that more than 65% of humanity lost over 80% of wealth/economic welfare to climate change; that likely requires damages spreading far beyond the hottest poor regions into much larger parts of the global economy, closer to a systemic-collapse world than a merely unequal one 2 sources. The NO path exists through tipping points and syn
There are 27,206 days remaining. If nothing changed from current expectations, this resolves YES easily: central forecasts still imply far less than an 80% loss for most of humanity, with a 16.5% median global GDP hit on Metaculus and much smaller damages in many standard model families at around 3°C warming 3 sources. Scope check: this is not just about whether vulnerable regions are devastated; to fail Q4, 80% of the world would need to be assessed as losing >80% of wealth/welfa
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