(a) The time left until the outcome to the question is known is 365 days. (b) The status quo outcome if nothing changed is a diplomatic freeze, with no formal trade talks occurring. (c) Considering the scope, 'official trade talks' includes trilateral rounds, working groups, and ministerial dialogues, offering multiple avenues for a YES. (d) A No outcome is likely due to the severe diplomatic friction following remarks by Japan's PM and China's explicit refusal to engage in formal dialogue until
Evaluating China's willingness to compartmentalize trade from geopolitical friction across its regional partnerships reinforced the severity of its bilateral freeze with Japan, slightly lowering the estimate.
Bilateral China-ROK FTA Phase 2 negotiations have been extremely active, with multiple subsequent rounds (such as the 14th and 16th) occurring throughout 2026. Given the established cadence of holding negotiations every few months, it is nearly certain that at least one official round or working group meeting will take place in the upcoming 12 months. Although friction elsewhere makes resumption of a broader regional trilateral framework unlikely, the strong independent momentum of direct bilate
Factoring in the low likelihood of resuming a broader regional trilateral framework due to friction elsewhere, the estimate was maintained at a very high level because of the strong independent momentum of direct bilateral negotiations.
While Sri Lanka's FTA negotiations with China have technically been on hold since 2017, political momentum recently shifted when the Sri Lankan cabinet appointed a National Trade Negotiation Committee in September 2026 to resume talks. Comparing this process both to other stalled trade talks and to highly institutionalized agreements modestly strengthens the case that this recent momentum will produce concrete engagement. With a full year to organize a working group meeting or formal negotiation
Comparing this process both to other stalled trade talks and to highly institutionalized agreements slightly bumped the forecast up, reflecting the recent momentum.
(a) The time left until the outcome to the question is known is one year. (b) The status quo outcome if nothing changed is mostly dormant, with conflicting reports about recent negotiation activity. (c) The scope specifically asks for official FTA negotiation rounds between China and Moldova. (d) A No outcome is highly likely because Moldova's rapid progress toward EU accession (opening multiple clusters in 2026) legally and practically precludes finalizing an independent FTA with China. Compari
Comparing this stalled process against China's active trade engagements with nations unencumbered by EU accession constraints prompted a moderate reduction in the probability of another official round.
With one year remaining, the status quo for the China-Palestine FTA is essentially dormant in terms of technical negotiations. While China and the Palestinian Authority have a 'strategic partnership,' there has been only one formal round since 2018. The devastating ongoing regional conflict severely limits the PA's institutional capacity to hold detailed trade negotiations. Viewing this negotiation alongside China's broader handling of diplomatically stalled trade talks and other regional agreem
Viewing this negotiation alongside China's broader handling of diplomatically stalled trade talks and other regional agreements slightly decreased the estimated likelihood of official rounds taking place.
In the remaining year, the status quo for China-Panama relations is a deep freeze. Talks have been stalled since 2019, and recent developments in 2025-2026 (Panama exiting the BRI, annulling Chinese port concessions, and establishing a parliamentary group with Taiwan) have triggered active Chinese retaliation and orders to halt new investments. A 'No' is the baseline as diplomatic tensions strongly discourage resumption of formal FTA rounds. Comparing Panama's severe diplomatic freeze to China's
Comparing Panama's severe diplomatic freeze to China's broader portfolio of stalled or constrained trade negotiations across Latin America and the Global South reinforced a very low likelihood of progress, edging the estimate slightly downward.
Diplomatic momentum between China and Norway has surged recently, highlighted by Norway's role as 'Guest of Honor' at the CIFTIS in September 2026, where the Norwegian PM stated an FTA is 'close'. Furthermore, the Chinese Embassy in Norway has explicitly indicated that the 11th negotiation round is scheduled for Spring 2027. Weighing this against China's broader push to finalize free trade agreements with other non-EU European nations further reinforces the likelihood that scheduled talks will p
Weighing this question against China's broader push to finalize free trade agreements with other non-EU European nations reinforced the likelihood that scheduled talks will proceed, slightly increasing the forecast.
365 days remain. The status quo is unusually advanced: the parties announced the negotiations were concluded on May 20, 2026 and moved into legal scrubbing/preparation for signing fta.mofcom.gov.cn. On a narrow literal reading of 'another FTA negotiation round,' that reduces confidence somewhat because the classic rounds may already be over; but under the stated resolution scope, a working-group meeting, ministerial trade dialogue, or signing-related session should count mecouncil.org. The NO case is
Adjusted the estimate slightly downward to reflect the added friction of coordinating a bloc-level event compared to the higher likelihood of independent bilateral talks with its member states.
China and Israel's FTA negotiations have been effectively stalled since 2019, with no official rounds held in years. The severe geopolitical friction, ongoing conflict in the Middle East, increasing U.S. pressure, and strong likelihood that regional instability continues to freeze trade talks make it highly unlikely that formal FTA negotiation rounds will resume within the September 2026 to September 2027 window. The status quo is deeply entrenched in a freeze, leaving only an 8% probability of
Set against related questions, this was nudged down to 8% to reflect the strong likelihood that regional instability continues to freeze trade talks.
While China and Honduras reached an advanced negotiation stage by mid-2024, progress has reportedly been stalled or frozen since late 2024 due to disagreements on goods and protectionism. A potential political pivot in Honduras following the early 2026 presidential transition introduces substantial downside risk. Although there is lingering bureaucratic momentum for a 'final push' or signing, the structural headwinds make a formal round or signing less likely than not.
Evaluating this alongside China's other stalled or frozen trade negotiations affirmed our initial estimate, reflecting the severe political and protectionist headwinds blocking progress.
There are 365 days left. The status quo if nothing changes is YES-leaning because China and Switzerland formally concluded the FTA upgrade on August 20, 2026, and the text is under legal review with signing targeted before the end of 2026 44 sources. Scope is favorable: this row resolves YES either on further official trade talks or on signing the concluded upgrade, and the latter is specifically expected soon admin.ch. The NO case is mostly procedural: signing could slip,
Evaluating this alongside China's other ongoing FTA negotiations with European states slightly lowered the forecast to account for the small baseline risk of procedural or diplomatic delays.
Following the signing of the Early Harvest Arrangement in March 2026, the institutional momentum for a broader Economic Partnership remains strong. Historically, such preliminary agreements are followed by working group meetings or further negotiation rounds within 6 to 12 months to hammer out full implementation details. Set against related questions, the high likelihood of routine follow-up engagements for recently activated agreements supports a 78% probability [fc:1a3f156f-7d8f-4705-93f5-6ae
Set against related questions, this was raised slightly to align with the high likelihood of routine follow-up engagements for recently activated agreements .
The China-Ecuador FTA went into effect in May 2024, with its first Free Trade Commission meeting held in December 2025. China has a consistent track record of holding annual commission or technical working group meetings for active FTAs. Despite the risk of delays due to Ecuador's domestic political landscape, the low bar for qualification (which includes working group meetings) and the full one-year window make a subsequent official meeting highly likely.
The forecast remains highly confident at 90%, consistent with our broader assessment of China's strong track record for maintaining routine administrative meetings for active FTAs, even amidst political headwinds that stall non-finalized trade negotiations.
The U.S. and China recently operationalized a new 'Board of Trade' mechanism, and a trade truce has been extended to January 10, 2027. This impending deadline will necessitate intensive, scheduled negotiation rounds and working group meetings in the final months of 2026 to either finalize a broader agreement or manage the potential fallout. The ongoing, active nature of these talks makes a qualifying meeting near certain.
Set against related questions , this estimate held steady, as impending trade truce deadlines make near-term talks almost certain regardless of broader geopolitical friction.
(a) There are 365 days until resolution. (b) The status quo involves intense ongoing negotiations over EV tariffs and 'price undertakings'. (c) Dialogues include the TIC, HED, and ministerial visits. (d) A NO would mean the complete cancellation of upcoming scheduled talks and a freeze in relations for a full year. (e) A YES is strongly supported by a specific, scheduled visit from EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič to Beijing on October 8-9, 2026. Even if tensions escalate, these meetings act
Evaluating this question alongside China's other bilateral trade negotiations maintained our near-certain estimate, with a minor downward adjustment to account for the systemic risk of a severe geopolitical freeze.
(a) 365 days remaining. (b) Status quo is a gradual thaw in relations after years of border-induced economic freeze. (c) Broad scope covers BRICS-related economic working groups, SED, JEG, or Special Representative meetings on border trade. (d) A NO is possible if India decides to maintain its strategic economic decoupling, insisting that formal trade mechanisms remain dormant despite border normalization. Evaluating this alongside China's other regional and strategic trade dialogues highlights
Evaluating this alongside China's other regional and strategic trade dialogues highlighted India's unique vulnerability to decoupling friction, resulting in a marginal decrease in the forecast probability.
(a) Time left: 365 days until the resolution date. (b) Status quo: Active, institutionalized engagement with the ChAFTA General Review officially underway. (c) Scope: The criteria are very broad, including any formal working group meeting, negotiation round, or ministerial dialogue (like JMEC). (d) Bear case: Geopolitical friction (e.g., AUKUS developments or US-China trade war spillover) could prompt Beijing to hit pause on talks, as it has done in the past. Australia's vulnerability to selecti
Assessing Australia's vulnerability to selective diplomatic freezes relative to other regional partners and major Western powers slightly reduced this estimate.
Following a recent revitalization of dialogue under the Starmer government, the 15th JETCO was held in July 2026. Official statements indicate that follow-up technical working groups covering services and investment are scheduled to meet ahead of the anticipated 2027 JETCO. Even if top-level political relations face minor headwinds, these technical working groups or a subsequent Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD) are highly likely to take place within the 1-year window.
Comparing this question's timeline against China's scheduled trade engagements with other European and major global partners confirmed the strong institutional momentum for UK talks, leaving the estimate unchanged.
(a) Time left: 365 days. (b) Status quo: Extremely high-frequency economic and strategic dialogue as part of regional integration and RCEP. (c) Scope: Broad inclusion of border economic cooperation committees, supply chain working groups, and steering committee meetings. (d) Bear case: A severe maritime clash in the South China Sea could trigger nationalist backlash, forcing a temporary suspension of formal government-to-government meetings. (e) Bull case: China and Vietnam share a densely integ
Evaluating this alongside China's other diplomatic engagements confirmed that highly institutionalized ties with key neighbors are especially resilient, leading to a slight upward adjustment in the near-certainty of talks.
Bilateral economic relations are expanding rapidly, supported by the High-Level Joint Committee and various sub-committees that meet regularly. Furthermore, the ongoing China-GCC FTA negotiations, which include working group rounds, recurring China-Saudi investment forums, and robust independent channels for Saudi-China engagement provide multiple avenues for qualifying trade talks. The strategic alignment between Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and China's Belt and Road Initiative strongly incentivi
Evaluating the robust independent channels for Saudi-China engagement alongside broader regional trade bloc negotiations led to a slight increase in the estimated likelihood of bilateral talks.
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