Summary The probability of 'Supergirl' (2026) achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 70 is assessed at 70%. The film presents a complex mix of early indicators. On one hand, director Craig Gillespie has a consistent track record, with a median Rotten Tomatoes score historically landing in the mid-to-high 70s. Additionally, the recent success of the first DCU film, 'Superman,' which secured an 83% score, establishes positive momentum and a strong benchmark for the franchise. Recent press screeni
Summary The probability that Brent crude oil will close above $74.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is assessed at 95%. The relevant active settlement contract for this date is the September 2026 delivery contract (BRENTU6), which is currently trading around $93.50. With only 20 days remaining until the settlement date, the current price provides a substantial buffer of roughly $18.50 above the $74.99 threshold. This translates to an approximately 20% price drop required for the outcome to resolve as
Summary The probability that Brent crude oil will close above $76.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is assessed at 93%. With only 20 days remaining until the June 30 settlement date, the relevant futures contract—expected to be the September 2026 delivery contract (BRENTU6) due to standard rolling rules—is currently trading around $93.50. This places the current price more than $16 above the target threshold of $76.99, providing a substantial price cushion. While the current market environment featur
Summary The probability that Brent crude oil will close above $90.99 per barrel on June 30, 2026, is evaluated at 59%. This assessment is primarily driven by current market pricing for the relevant futures contract and an elevated volatility environment in the global energy market. The active settlement contract for the target date is the September 2026 delivery contract (BRENTU6), which is currently trading in the $93 to $94 range. Because the current price is a few dollars above the $90.99 thr
Summary The probability that Brent crude oil will close above $92.99 on June 30, 2026, is estimated at 52%. The relevant settlement benchmark for this date is the September 2026 delivery contract, which is currently trading in the $93 to $94 range. Because the current forward price sits just above the $92.99 threshold, the likelihood of the contract closing above this mark is near a coin flip, leaning slightly positive. Market conditions are currently characterized by elevated implied volatility
Summary The assessment of a 40% probability for Brent crude oil closing above $96.99/Bbl on June 30, 2026, rests on current market pricing, near-term volatility, and structural contract rules. With 20 days remaining until settlement, the active contract for June 30 is the September 2026 delivery contract, owing to standard roll rules. This contract is currently trading in the $93 to $94 range. The market is experiencing elevated implied volatility, running at roughly 50% to 54% annualized. This
Summary SpaceX is on track to maintain a high operational tempo in June 2026, making it highly probable that the company will conduct more than 12 launches this month. As of June 10, SpaceX has already completed 4 missions. There are approximately 7 additional launches firmly manifested by June 24. If executed as planned, this brings the total to 11 launches before the final week of June even begins. Based on the company's established launch cadence, we can project about 3 additional missions oc
Summary SpaceX is currently demonstrating a robust launch cadence for June 2026, making it highly likely that the company will exceed 13 launches for the month. As of June 10, four launches have already been successfully completed. Looking ahead, the manifest shows approximately seven more missions firmly scheduled to launch by June 24. This sets a baseline of 11 launches before the final week of the month begins. SpaceX's typical operational cadence usually allows for an additional three missio
Summary The probability that the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz reaches 60 before August 1, 2026, is estimated at 15%. As of mid-June 2026, the moving average of transit calls is near zero following a recent halt in traffic, including an IRGC closure on June 6 and zero transits in the preceding 72 hours. Peace talks are currently stalled, presenting a significant political hurdle to reopening. Even if an agreement is reached immediately, physical and logistica
Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 as reported by the IMF PortWatch before December 1, 2026, is estimated at 53%. Currently, transit calls are near zero following a recent halt in traffic and a formal closure by the IRGC on June 6, 2026. Peace negotiations are presently stalled, making near-term normalization practically impossible. Even if a diplomatic resolution is reached in the near future, the physical and administr
Summary A return to a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz before July 1, 2026, is highly unlikely, resulting in a low 4% probability. As of June 10, 2026, traffic is virtually zero following the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) closure of the Strait on June 6. Achieving the required volume of traffic within a 20-day window is obstructed by both political and physical realities. Peace talks are currently stalled, and even in the highly unlikely event of a
Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 before September 1, 2026, is assessed at 28%. Given the recent halt in traffic, including an IRGC closure on June 6 resulting in zero transits over a recent 72-hour period, near-term normalization is highly unlikely. Peace talks remain stalled, meaning an immediate political resolution is not on the horizon. Even in the optimistic scenario where an agreement is reached quickly, the phys
Summary An official declaration of El Niño conditions before July 1, 2026, is highly probable, driven almost entirely by the impending Climate Prediction Center (CPC) ENSO Diagnostic Discussion scheduled for June 11. Recent oceanic observations show that Niño-3.4 Sea Surface Temperature (SST) anomalies have surged to +0.7°C, clearly exceeding the +0.5°C threshold required for an El Niño episode. Furthermore, the CPC's own forecasts assign an 82% probability to El Niño forming in the May-July per
Summary The most likely outcome for the Federal Reserve's July 2026 meeting is that the central bank will maintain its current interest rate, representing a 0bps change. Futures markets and implied probabilities consistently price a hold as the dominant scenario, currently reflecting around an 85 to 90% likelihood. Despite a macroeconomic environment that leans slightly hawkish, current inflation and employment data do not suggest a need for immediate, drastic action in either direction. The rec
Summary Oklo is currently estimated to have a 31% chance of achieving criticality before August 1, 2026. With the deadline less than two months away from the current date of June 10, 2026, the timeline is extremely tight for any remaining regulatory or operational steps. While the broader advanced nuclear sector has seen rapid recent progress—evidenced by Antares Nuclear already achieving criticality and front-runners like Aalo Atomics and Valar Atomics nearing the final stages—Oklo trails these
Summary Executive Order 14160, issued in January 2025 with the intent to end birthright citizenship, faces a nearly insurmountable legal wall, making it highly improbable that it will come into effect before August 2026. Since its issuance, the order has been entirely paralyzed by ongoing federal court injunctions. The decisive battleground is the Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments in the defining case, Trump v. Barbara, on April 1, 2026. Analysis of these proceedings reveals that a major
Summary The probability of a comprehensive crypto market structure bill becoming law before August 1, 2026, is estimated at 14%. The primary legislative vehicle that meets this requirement is the CLARITY Act (H.R. 3633). While this bill has demonstrated notable momentum—advancing out of the Senate Banking Committee on May 14, 2026, and being placed on the legislative calendar on June 1—there is an extremely tight timeline to achieve full passage by August 1. In just under two months, lawmakers m
Summary With less than two months remaining before August, the probability of the US and Iran finalizing a comprehensive nuclear agreement is low at 13%. While there is significant pressure on both sides to reach an agreement due to the costs of active regional conflicts, blockades, and domestic political incentives, the current state of negotiations remains heavily strained. Iran recently rejected a US proposal, and talks are currently limited to counteroffers passed through mediators. Furtherm
Summary There are significant incentives for both the United States and Iran to reach an agreement, driven by the costs of active conflict, economic blockades, and domestic political pressures. However, the likelihood of securing a comprehensive nuclear deal before September remains low, assessed at 19%. Negotiations are currently strained, with Iran recently rejecting a US proposal and submitting counteroffers through mediators amid continued military strikes and escalating tensions with the IA
Summary Mike Mazzei is the strong favorite to secure the 2026 Republican gubernatorial nomination in Oklahoma, primarily due to the powerful endorsement he received from Donald Trump on May 29. In a deep-red state like Oklahoma, a Trump endorsement carries exceptional weight and serves as a major signal to the conservative base. Recent polling from JMC Analytics (June 2-3) reinforces Mazzei's leading position, showing him at 26%, ahead of his closest competitor, Gentner Drummond, who sits at 21%
Summary The Republican gubernatorial nomination in South Dakota has advanced to a July 28 runoff between Toby Doeden and incumbent Lieutenant Governor Larry Rhoden. Doeden enters the runoff with a plurality lead, having secured approximately 31% of the vote in the June primary compared to Rhoden's 25%. Doeden's campaign is bolstered by his strong outsider, anti-establishment appeal and a significant self-funding advantage, giving him structural momentum heading into a low-turnout summer election
Summary Barry Moore is currently favored to win the Alabama Republican Senate runoff on June 16, 2026, with a 69% probability of securing the nomination. Moore enters the runoff with significant structural advantages, having led the first round of voting with 39% compared to Jared Hudson's 26%. Crucially, Moore has secured the endorsement of Donald Trump, a highly influential factor in Alabama Republican primaries, alongside strong institutional backing. However, the race is closer than these fu
Summary The race for the Democratic nomination for the Senate in Michigan is effectively a three-way contest between Abdul El-Sayed (58%), Haley Stevens (31%), and Mallory McMorrow (11%), with all other listed potential candidates not running. El-Sayed stands as the clear frontrunner, largely due to structural advantages within the primary field. With the moderate wing of the electorate split between Stevens and McMorrow, El-Sayed has a distinct opportunity to secure the nomination by consolidat
Summary The probability of the maximum WTI front-month settle price reaching $135.01 by December 31, 2026, is assessed at 28%. So far in 2026, WTI peaked around $112-$113 in April, demonstrating that the market is already operating at elevated levels and within range of higher thresholds if conditions worsen. The fundamental driver of oil prices right now is the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Because this geopolitical flashpoint directly threatens global supply channels, the distributio
Summary The probability of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issuing a new combined license (COL) by December 31, 2026, is exceptionally low, estimated at 2%. This assessment hinges on a critical distinction in the nuclear regulatory process: the difference between a construction permit and a combined license. While several advanced reactor projects, such as TerraPower, have recently applied for or received construction permits, the specific criteria for this event explicitly require the i
Summary Anthropic is currently assessed a 20% probability of having the United States federal government take an equity stake of above 0% by January 2027. The broader context of government equity stakes in technology companies as of mid-2026 shows a stark divide between companies actively involved in federal schemes and those remaining outside of them. In May 2026, the Commerce Department issued Letters of Intent for a $2 billion quantum computing package that included minority equity stakes in
Summary The probability of observing more than 10 human cases of New World screwworm (NWS) in the United States during 2026 is extremely low, assessed at just 4%. As of June 10, 2026, there have been zero human cases reported in the US. While there is an ongoing large-scale outbreak among animals in Central America and Mexico, with recent detections in Texas and New Mexico, NWS predominantly affects animals, not humans. Historically, human infestations in the US are exceedingly rare. Even during
Summary Graham Platner is the presumed Democratic nominee after winning the June primary, with only a marginal 2-3% risk of withdrawing prior to the July replacement deadline due to ongoing scandals. The core of this 55% probability hinges on the highly competitive general election matchup against Republican incumbent Susan Collins. The race currently leans slightly Democratic, driven by Platner's modest polling lead. However, the contest remains remarkably tight. Collins has a well-documented t
Summary A Market-Wide Circuit Breaker (MWCB) on the New York Stock Exchange is an extremely rare tail-risk event that requires a 7% single-day drop in the S&P 500. Historically, this has only occurred during severe and acute financial crises, specifically in 1997 and on four separate occasions during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The probability of an MWCB occurring before 2027 is assessed at 13%, reflecting the sheer improbability of such a steep intraday crash under current
Summary The likelihood of legislation temporarily suspending or reducing the federal excise tax on gasoline becoming law before January 1, 2027, is currently assessed at 23%. While there was an initial legislative push in May 2026 driven by spiking fuel costs and political maneuvering, momentum has significantly cooled. A primary driver of this reassessment is the recent decline in gas and oil prices, which have dropped approximately 18 cents a gallon amid ceasefire hopes. This price relief remo
Summary The probability of the United States having at least 4,700 data centers listed by the end of 2026 is assessed at 67%. This assessment is driven by the robust and sustained growth of U.S. data center listings on Data Center Map, fueled by the underlying boom in artificial intelligence and cloud computing infrastructure. During the first half of the year, listing additions have averaged between 70 and 90 per month. Although recent weeks have seen a slight moderation to approximately 60 add
Summary The race for the Democratic nomination in New York's 13th Congressional District has narrowed into a highly competitive, two-person contest between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat (estimated at a 51% probability) and challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. Chevalier has mounted a formidable insurgent campaign, generating substantial momentum and demonstrating an ability to seriously threaten Espaillat's hold on the seat. However, the fundamental dynamics of the race ultimately g
Summary The probability that "Supergirl" will achieve a Rotten Tomatoes score above 30 is assessed at a near-certain 98%. This exceptionally high confidence reflects the fact that a score of 30 or below is a disastrous outcome typically reserved for the most notoriously flawed cinematic misfires. While "Supergirl" has experienced a somewhat turbulent production—including extensive post-production reworking and mixed test screenings that highlighted issues with the villain and action sequences—th
Summary The probability of "Supergirl" achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 35% is exceptionally high, sitting at 97%. While the film has experienced a somewhat troubled production history, including extensive post-production reworking and mixed reactions from early test screenings regarding its villain and action sequences, strong mitigating factors point away from a critical disaster. Recent press screenings have generated highly positive buzz, particularly highlighting standout performance
Summary The probability of "Supergirl" achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 40% is extremely high at 96%, driven by the reliable track record of its director, a solid benchmark set by the recent DCU launch, and positive early critical reactions. Director Craig Gillespie generally delivers critically well-received films, with his median Rotten Tomatoes score historically landing in the mid-to-high 70s. Furthermore, the first film in the newly revamped DC Universe, "Superman," recently set a hi
Summary The probability that "Supergirl" achieves a Rotten Tomatoes score above 45 is extremely high at 94%. This assessment is anchored by a median expectation for the film's score landing squarely in the mid-70s, making a score of 45 or below highly unlikely. Director Craig Gillespie brings a reliable track record to the project, with his median Rotten Tomatoes scores consistently sitting in the mid-to-high 70s. Furthermore, the newly launched DC Universe franchise recently set a strong benchm
Summary The probability that 'Supergirl: Woman of Tomorrow' will receive a Rotten Tomatoes score above 50% is extremely high, estimated at 92%. This assessment relies on several converging factors surrounding the film's production, directing talent, and the broader context of the new DC Universe (DCU). Craig Gillespie, the film's director, has a historically strong track record; his median Rotten Tomatoes score sits comfortably in the mid-to-high 70s, indicating a reliable ability to produce cri
Summary The upcoming 2026 film "Supergirl" has a strong 89% probability of achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 55. This assessment is anchored by the historical performance of its director, Craig Gillespie, whose median Rotten Tomatoes scores consistently land in the mid-to-high 70s. Furthermore, the film is part of the newly rebooted DC Universe (DCU), which recently established a solid benchmark with "Superman" scoring an 83%. A threshold of 55% is relatively low for a major studio tentpol
Summary The upcoming DCU film "Supergirl" currently has strong prospects of achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 60%, with an 86% probability of doing so. Early signals for the film are mixed but lean positive overall. On the one hand, the film underwent extensive post-production reworking, and early test screenings highlighted notable flaws, particularly regarding the villain and action sequences. On the other hand, more recent press screenings have skewed positively, with critics particular
Summary The outlook for the 2026 release of "Supergirl" suggests a strong likelihood of achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 65%. The film is entering the market on the heels of the first DC Universe (DCU) installment, "Superman," which established a solid baseline with an 83% approval rating. This success provides a strong foundation of goodwill for the franchise. Furthermore, director Craig Gillespie brings a reliable track record to the project, with a median Rotten Tomatoes score historic
Summary The probability of Supergirl (2026) achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 75% is estimated at 55%. This slightly better than coin-flip assessment balances a reliable director and strong franchise momentum against a troubled post-production history. Director Craig Gillespie has a consistent track record, with a median Rotten Tomatoes score in the mid-to-high 70s, which establishes a baseline expectation for the film. Furthermore, the broader DC Universe franchise recently set a solid cr
Summary The assessment of Supergirl (2026) achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 80% reflects a complex mix of promising elements and clear production hurdles. Early signals are notably mixed. On the negative side, the film underwent extensive post-production reworking following test screenings that highlighted significant flaws in the narrative, particularly concerning the villain and action sequences. Conversely, recent press screenings have skewed positive, with strong praise directed at Mi
Summary The assessment that 'Supergirl' (2026) has a 19% probability of achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 85 is grounded in a synthesis of the film's production history, early critical signals, and historical baselines. While the recent release of 'Superman' established a solid 83% benchmark for the new DCU, 'Supergirl' carries more mixed early indicators. Extensive post-production reworking and lukewarm test screenings have pointed to specific narrative flaws, particularly concerning the
Summary A Rotten Tomatoes score above 90 represents near-universal critical acclaim, a threshold rarely crossed by comic book adaptations unless they are considered genre-defining. For "Supergirl" (2026), reaching this elite tier is highly improbable, resulting in a 6% probability. The film's early indicators point toward a solid but ultimately flawed movie. Director Craig Gillespie is a reliable filmmaker, but his historical median Rotten Tomatoes scores sit firmly in the mid-to-high 70s. Furth
Summary Supergirl (2026) has a 2% chance of achieving a Rotten Tomatoes score above 95. A score this high requires universal, near-unanimous critical acclaim, which is exceedingly rare for the superhero genre and usually reserved for industry-defining masterpieces. While there are positive signals for the film, such as strong praise for Milly Alcock's lead performance and Jason Momoa's turn as Lobo in recent press screenings, the overall production history presents significant hurdles. Extensive
Summary The assessment that Brent crude oil has a 90% probability of closing above $78.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is driven primarily by the strong current market pricing of the relevant futures contract and the relatively short time remaining until settlement. The active settlement contract for June 30, 2026—which is the September 2026 delivery contract due to standard exchange roll rules—is currently trading at elevated levels around $93.00 to $94.00. This places the current price approximat
Summary The probability that Brent crude oil will close above $80.99 on June 30, 2026, is estimated at 87%. With just 20 days remaining until the settlement date, the active contract (September 2026 delivery) is currently trading at approximately $93.50 per barrel. This provides a substantial buffer of more than $12 above the $80.99 threshold. Current market dynamics reflect elevated near-term geopolitical risks, particularly concerning US-Iran tensions and potential disruptions in the Strait of
Summary The assessment that Brent crude oil will close above $82.99 on June 30, 2026, with an 83% probability is driven primarily by the strong buffer between current trading levels and the target threshold. Due to standard contract rolling rules, the active settlement contract for this date is the September 2026 delivery contract, which is currently trading around $93 to $94 per barrel. This provides a robust cushion of approximately $10 above the $82.99 mark. With only 20 days remaining until
Summary The probability of 78% reflects a market environment where Brent crude is currently trading comfortably above the target threshold, but remains subject to exceptionally high volatility. As of June 10, 2026, the active settlement contract for the end of the month (the September 2026 delivery contract) is priced in the $93 to $94 range. This provides a substantial buffer of approximately $8.50 to $9.00 against the $84.99 threshold. With only 20 days remaining until the June 30 settlement,
Summary The probability of Brent crude oil closing above $86.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is estimated at 72%. As of June 10, 2026, the active settlement contract for the target date—the September 2026 delivery contract (BRENTU6), determined by the standard 5-business-day roll rule—is actively trading between $93 and $94 per barrel. This provides a substantial price cushion of $6 to $7 above the $86.99 threshold. The market is currently experiencing elevated implied volatility, pricing at approx
Summary The probability of Brent crude closing above $88.99 on June 30, 2026, is assessed at 66%. This assessment is anchored by the current market dynamics where the relevant delivery contract is trading around $93 to $94 per barrel. With the current price providing a cushion of approximately $4 to $5 above the $88.99 threshold, and only 20 days remaining until settlement, the structural advantage strongly favors the price remaining above the target. However, this is counterbalanced by an envir
Summary With roughly 20 days remaining until the June 30, 2026 settlement date, the probability of Brent crude oil closing above $94.99 is assessed at 46%. The relevant active settlement contract (expected to be the September 2026 delivery contract due to standard roll rules) is currently trading in the $93.00 to $94.00 range. Because the current price sits just below the $94.99 threshold, a "No" outcome is slightly favored. However, this market is currently characterized by exceptionally high i
Summary With the June 30, 2026 settlement date only 20 days away, the Brent crude oil active settlement contract (expected to be the September 2026 delivery contract, BRENTU6) is currently trading in the $93 to $94 range. A closing price above $98.99 requires an upward move of approximately $5.50, or about 6% from current levels. The 34% probability reflects that while the baseline price remains below the threshold, the market is currently experiencing exceptionally high implied volatility—runni
Summary The probability of Brent crude oil closing above $100.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is estimated at 29%. With exactly 20 days remaining until the active settlement date—which aligns with the September 2026 delivery contract—the underlying price is currently trading in the $93 to $94 per barrel range. To exceed the $100.99 threshold, the market requires an increase of roughly $7 to $8 from current levels. While this represents a notable upward jump for a relatively condensed time frame, im
Summary The probability of Brent crude oil closing above $102.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is estimated at 24%. As of June 10, 2026, the active settlement contract for this date is trading around $93 to $94. With 20 days remaining until the settlement date, an increase of approximately 10% is required to breach the $102.99 threshold. This represents a significant, but not improbable, upside move over a relatively short timeframe. Current option-implied volatilities are elevated at roughly 50% to
Summary The assessment that there is a 19% probability of Brent crude oil closing above $104.99 per barrel on June 30, 2026, is rooted in current market pricing and options-implied volatility. As of June 10, 2026, the active settlement contract (expected to be the September 2026 delivery contract, or BRENTU6) is trading in the $93 to $94 range. While $104.99 represents a significant premium to the current spot price, financial markets reflect a notable right skew in potential outcomes due to ele
Summary As of June 10, 2026, Brent crude oil for the September delivery contract is trading at approximately $93.50 per barrel. With exactly 20 days remaining until the June 30 settlement date, reaching the $106.99 threshold requires an increase of roughly $13.50, or 14.4%. Under normal market conditions, a price movement of this magnitude over a short timeframe would be highly unlikely. However, current geopolitical tensions, particularly involving the US and Iran and potential disruptions in t
Summary The assessment that Brent crude oil will close above $108.99 per barrel on June 30, 2026, rests at 12%. With roughly 20 days remaining until the settlement date, the active contract (September 2026 delivery, BRENTU6, due to the five-business-day roll rule) is currently trading in the $93 to $94 range. Reaching the $108.99 threshold requires an approximate 16% to 17% price increase in less than three weeks. While this is a substantial climb, current options markets indicate elevated impli
Summary The probability of the Brent crude oil active settlement contract closing above $110.99 USD/Bbl on June 30, 2026, is assessed at 9%. As of early June 2026, the active settlement contract for the target date (the September 2026 delivery contract) is trading in the $93 to $94 range. Reaching a threshold above $110.99 within a 20-day timeframe requires an approximate 18% to 19% upward price swing. However, the market is currently experiencing significant near-term geopolitical risks, partic
Summary The assessment of a 7% probability for Brent crude oil closing above $112.99 on June 30, 2026, is driven by the significant distance between the current market price and the target threshold, balanced against elevated geopolitical risks. With the relevant settlement contract currently trading between $93 and $94, an increase to $112.99 would require an aggressive price rally of over 20% in just 20 days. Standard market calculations confirm this is a tail-risk event. However, implied vola
Summary SpaceX is on an incredibly strong trajectory to complete more than 10 launches in June 2026. As of June 10, the company has already completed 4 launches, setting a rapid initial pace. With approximately 7 additional missions firmly scheduled to lift off by June 24, SpaceX is projected to reach roughly 11 launches even before entering the final week of the month. Maintaining their standard operational cadence typically yields around 3 missions in the final week, resulting in a modal expec
Summary SpaceX is maintaining an aggressive launch cadence in June 2026, making it highly probable (96%) that they will complete more than 11 launches by the end of the month. As of June 10, the company has already successfully completed 4 launches. Looking ahead, there are approximately 7 more firmly scheduled missions set to occur before June 24. This projected timeline puts SpaceX on track to reach 11 launches before entering the final week of June. Reaching Above 11 requires at least 12 laun
Summary As of June 10, SpaceX has completed 4 launches. With approximately 7 additional missions firmly scheduled by June 24, the company is on track to log roughly 11 launches before the final week of June. Typical launch cadence suggests about 3 additional missions in the last week of the month, which brings the most likely outcome (the mode) to exactly 14 launches. Because this market resolves positively only if SpaceX completes "Above 14" launches (meaning 15 or more), hitting the expected 1
Summary SpaceX has completed 4 launches by June 10, 2026, and has roughly 7 more firmly scheduled by June 24. This places the company on track to log approximately 11 launches before entering the final week of June. Assuming a typical launch cadence of about 3 missions during the final week of the month, the most likely total number of launches for June is 14. Achieving more than 15 launches (16 or more total) would necessitate a flawless execution of the current dense manifest, plus the potenti
Summary SpaceX has completed 4 launches by June 10 and has approximately 7 more firmly scheduled by June 24. This trajectory places the expected number of launches before the final week of June at roughly 11. Given the typical cadence of an additional 3 missions in the final week of a month, the most realistic modal estimate is 14 total launches. Reaching 17 or more launches—the minimum required to resolve "Above 16" as true—would demand an exceptional, virtually flawless schedule. Achieving thi
Summary SpaceX is highly unlikely to achieve more than 18 launches in June 2026, with the probability standing at a marginal 1%. As of June 10, the company has completed 4 launches for the month. Looking at the current manifest, there are approximately 7 additional missions firmly scheduled by June 24. If executed without major delays, this puts the expected count at roughly 11 launches logged before the final week of June. Maintaining a typical cadence of about 3 missions during that final week
Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 before June 15, 2026, is effectively negligible, assessed at 1%. With the current date being June 10, 2026, there are only five days left for this threshold to be met. The 7-day moving average is currently near zero following severe recent escalations, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) closing the strait on June 6 and a complete halt in traffic over the last 72 hours.
Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 by October 1, 2026, stands at 39%. This assessment balances a nearly four-month time horizon against severe current operational constraints. As of June 10, 2026, the 7-day moving average is virtually zero following an IRGC closure on June 6 and a complete halt in traffic over recent days. A resumption of normal traffic volumes requires clearing two massive hurdles: achieving a political
Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 before November 1, 2026, is assessed at 46%. Recent developments indicate a severe deterioration in maritime traffic in the region. Following the reported closure of the strait by the IRGC on June 6, 2026, transit calls have plunged, with zero transits recorded over a recent 72-hour period. Consequently, the 7-day moving average currently sits near zero. Reaching a threshold of 60 daily
Summary The current environment in the Strait of Hormuz is characterized by a complete halt in traffic following the IRGC's closure of the waterway on June 6, 2026. Reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls by January 1, 2027, is assessed at a 61% probability, reflecting both the lengthy time remaining and the severe logistical hurdles that must be overcome. Reaching the threshold requires more than just a political resolution; it necessitates a massive physical and commercial recovery
Summary The probability of an El Niño declaration before August 1, 2026, is extremely high at 96%. Currently, Niño-3.4 sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies are at +0.7°C, which is already safely above the +0.5°C threshold required for an El Niño designation. Official estimates indicate an 82% probability for El Niño conditions to fully emerge during the May-July observation period. The next official update is scheduled for June 11, 2026, presenting an immediate opportunity for an official dec
Summary An official declaration of El Niño conditions before September 1, 2026, is virtually certain, with a 97% probability. The primary driver is the rapid and significant warming of the equatorial Pacific Ocean. As of early June 2026, Sea Surface Temperature (SST) anomalies in the crucial Niño-3.4 region have already reached +0.7°C, surpassing the standard +0.5°C threshold required for an El Niño event. The Climate Prediction Center (CPC) itself estimates an 82% probability for El Niño format
Summary As of early June 2026, sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the Niño-3.4 region have reached +0.7°C, cleanly exceeding the +0.5°C threshold required for an El Niño episode. The Climate Prediction Center (CPC) requires both this oceanic threshold to be met and corresponding atmospheric responses (coupling) to officially declare an El Niño Advisory, transitioning from the current Watch status. Given the rapid and sustained warming, the CPC officially estimates an 82% chance of El Niño formin
Summary By January 1, 2027, an official El Niño declaration is virtually certain, warranting a 99% probability. Niño-3.4 Sea Surface Temperature (SST) anomalies have already reached +0.7°C as of early June 2026, actively surpassing the +0.5°C threshold required for an El Niño phenomenon. The Climate Prediction Center (CPC) estimates an 82% probability of development within the immediate May-July 2026 window alone, and its official probabilities for the remainder of the year exceed 96%. While an
Summary The current economic environment and futures market pricing strongly suggest that the Federal Reserve will maintain its benchmark interest rate at the July 2026 meeting, with the balance of risks leaning heavily toward a rate hike rather than a cut. Consequently, the probability of an aggressive rate cut of more than 25 basis points is extremely low, estimated at just 1%. Current futures market data implies an approximately 82% probability of a rate hold and a 15% probability of a rate h
Summary The probability of the Federal Reserve cutting interest rates by exactly 25 basis points at their July 2026 meeting is assessed at an extremely low 1%. The overwhelming consensus points toward the Fed maintaining current rates, a scenario assigned an 89% probability. Meanwhile, the residual risk is distinctly skewed toward a rate hike rather than a cut, with a 25-basis-point hike standing at 8%. Recent macroeconomic data has demonstrated persistent inflation and robust economic performan
Summary The probability of the Federal Reserve implementing a 25-basis-point rate hike at its July 2026 meeting is estimated at 8%. This reflects a strong consensus that the Fed will likely maintain its current target rate (an 89% probability), while acknowledging a modest tail risk tilted toward a hike rather than a cut. Recent macroeconomic indicators, including resilient economic data and the presence of a relatively hawkish Fed Chair (Kevin Warsh), suggest that if a policy change were to occ
Summary The probability of a rate hike exceeding 25 basis points at the Federal Reserve's July 2026 meeting is extremely low, estimated at just 1%. The overwhelming consensus, supported by both futures market pricing and current prediction market data, points to the Fed maintaining the current interest rate (an 89% probability) or potentially hiking by exactly 25 basis points (an 8% probability). Recent economic data and the appointment of a hawkish Fed Chair, Kevin Warsh, have skewed the broade
Summary Aalo Atomics stands at an 80% probability of achieving criticality before the August 1, 2026 deadline, positioning it as the strongest remaining candidate in the current reactor commercialization race (following Antares Nuclear, which already achieved criticality on June 4). The fundamental driver for this high assessment is Aalo's advanced stage of regulatory and physical preparation. The company has successfully navigated the most challenging bureaucratic and logistical hurdles: its Do
Summary Antares Nuclear has already achieved criticality, having successfully reached this milestone on June 4, 2026. Because today is June 10, 2026, the primary uncertainty regarding whether the company will meet the August 2026 deadline has been entirely eliminated. While several other competitors in the advanced nuclear sector are making strong progress—such as Aalo Atomics (80%) and Valar Atomics (76%), which are currently in the Operational Readiness Review phase—Antares is the only competi
Summary Atomic Alchemy holds a 48% probability of achieving criticality before August 2026, positioning it in the middle of the pack among emerging nuclear companies. As a subsidiary of Oklo, Atomic Alchemy benefits from substantial financial backing and shared regulatory expertise. However, with the August 1 deadline less than two months away (today being June 10, 2026), the timeline for completing the remaining regulatory and operational milestones is tight. Unlike front-runners such as Antare
Summary Deep Fission faces a practically insurmountable challenge to achieve nuclear criticality before August 2026, leading to a minimal probability of 1%. With the deadline less than two months away (August 1, 2026), the company remains in the early stages of its reactor development. It currently lacks both the physical infrastructure and the necessary regulatory milestones required to initiate a nuclear chain reaction. The nuclear industry is characterized by rigorous, time-consuming processe
Summary Last Energy faces an extremely low probability (3%) of achieving criticality before the August 1, 2026 deadline. With the target date less than two months away, achieving criticality requires a company to be in the final stages of the operational pipeline, which entails completing reactor assembly, receiving nuclear fuel, and undergoing final Operational Readiness Reviews. Current evaluations indicate that Last Energy is still in the early stages of development and lacks the essential re
Summary Natura Resources has a 1% probability of achieving criticality before August 2026. With the deadline less than two months away (August 1, 2026), the company is either in the very early stages of construction or broadly lacks the necessary regulatory milestones to reach this highly complex stage of nuclear deployment. Reaching criticality requires clearing a rigorous, multi-step sequence of stringent regulatory approvals, completing physical reactor construction, receiving and safely load
Summary Radiant Industries currently holds a 9% probability of achieving criticality before August 2026. With the deadline less than two months away from the current date of mid-June 2026, the timeframe for completing necessary regulatory approvals, site construction, fuel delivery, and Operational Readiness Reviews (ORR) is exceptionally tight. In stark contrast to industry front-runners like Aalo Atomics—which has its safety analysis approved, assembly completed, and fuel delivered—or Antares
Summary Terrestrial Energy is assessed at a highly improbable 4% chance of achieving criticality before August 2026. With the deadline less than two months away, the company shows no realistic path to reaching this complex operational milestone. Reaching criticality requires a reactor to be fully assembled, fueled, and rigorously reviewed through an Operational Readiness Review phase—milestones that industry front-runners like Aalo Atomics and Valar Atomics have spent significant time navigating
Summary Valar Atomics presents a highly favorable profile for achieving criticality before the August 2026 deadline, assessed at a 76% probability. The overarching rationale is driven by a dual-pathway to success. First, Valar Atomics previously conducted a zero-power criticality event at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). There is a substantial chance that this event already satisfies the technical criteria for this assessment, which would effectively mean the milestone has been met. Se
Summary The probability of a crypto market structure bill becoming law before July 1, 2026, is estimated at 2%. The primary legislative vehicle that meets the criteria is the CLARITY Act (H.R. 3633). While this bill has seen recent momentum—advancing out of the Senate Banking Committee on May 14, 2026, and being placed on the legislative calendar on June 1—the timeline for passage before July 1 is exceptionally constrained. With only 20 days remaining, the legislative hurdles are substantial. La
Summary The probability of a crypto market structure bill becoming law before 2027 stands at 46%. The primary legislative vehicle for this effort, the CLARITY Act (H.R. 3633), has demonstrated significant momentum. It advanced out of the Senate Banking Committee on May 14, 2026, and was officially placed on the legislative calendar on June 1. However, realizing final enactment before the end of the year requires navigating a gauntlet of substantial procedural and political hurdles. Chief among t
Summary The probability of a US-Iranian nuclear deal being finalized before July is assessed at a very low 5%. Although there are underlying incentives for both sides to eventually reach an agreement—such as active conflict, blockade costs, and the desire for regional stability—near-term prospects remain poor. The primary obstacle is the strict resolution criteria for a qualifying deal. A simple ceasefire or a war-ending Memorandum of Understanding that defers nuclear issues to a later date will
Summary The probability of the US and Iran agreeing to a new, qualifying nuclear deal before October 2026 is estimated at 23%. While there are strong underlying incentives for both sides to de-escalate and reach a comprehensive agreement due to the costs of active conflict, regional blockades, and domestic political pressures, the near-term timeline makes a finalized nuclear agreement highly challenging. Negotiations are currently strained. Iran has recently rejected a US proposal, and talks are
Summary The probability of the US and Iran agreeing to a qualifying nuclear deal before November is assessed at 27%. While both nations face significant pressure to reach an agreement to alleviate active conflict, blockade costs, and domestic political pressures, the near-term prospects for a formal, verifiable nuclear deal are relatively low. Negotiations are currently strained, highlighted by Iran's recent rejection of a US proposal and subsequent counteroffers mediated by third parties. Addin
Summary The probability of the US and Iran agreeing to a new, qualifying nuclear deal before December stands at 34%. While there is substantial underlying pressure on both nations to reach a diplomatic resolution—driven by the costs of active conflict, economic blockades, and domestic political incentives—the likelihood of finalizing a comprehensive nuclear agreement within this specific timeframe remains limited. Current negotiations are strained; Iran recently rejected a US proposal and is neg
Summary The assessment that a qualifying US-Iran nuclear deal will be agreed upon before 2027 stands at 39%. This probability reflects a tension between the strong, overarching incentives for both nations to de-escalate and the immense diplomatic hurdles currently blocking a comprehensive, verifiable agreement. Both the United States and Iran are under significant pressure to reach an accord due to the costs of active conflict, regional blockades, and domestic political factors. However, the pat
Summary Gentner Drummond's 15% probability of securing the 2026 Oklahoma Republican gubernatorial nomination reflects his position as the primary challenger to the frontrunner, Mike Mazzei, while acknowledging the significant hurdles he faces. In a fragmented nine-candidate field, no single candidate is expected to secure the outright majority needed in the June 16 primary to avoid an August 25 runoff. Recent polling conducted in early June indicates a tight race for the top spots, with Mazzei l
Summary The probability of Charles McCall winning the 2026 Oklahoma Republican gubernatorial nomination is assessed at 1%. The Republican primary field in Oklahoma is crowded, with nine candidates officially running, but the race is heavily dominated by two frontrunners: Mike Mazzei and Gentner Drummond. Recent polling from early June indicates Mazzei leading the pack at 26%, bolstered significantly by a highly influential May 29 endorsement from Donald Trump. Drummond closely trails at 21%. Giv
Summary Jake Merrick is an extreme longshot for the 2026 Republican gubernatorial nomination in Oklahoma, reflected in his highly constrained 2% probability. The race is dominated by Mike Mazzei, who is the overwhelming favorite following a highly influential endorsement from Donald Trump on May 29. In a deep-red state like Oklahoma, this endorsement acts as a near-insurmountable advantage. Recent polling from JMC Analytics (June 2-3) demonstrates this reality, placing Mazzei in the lead at 26%
Summary Ryan Walters will not be the Republican nominee for Governor of Oklahoma in 2026. The definitive reason for this 0% probability is that Walters did not officially file to run for the office. The candidate filing deadline has already passed, solidifying the official field of contenders for the June 16 primary. The race is currently a competitive, fragmented nine-candidate contest led by Mike Mazzei, who recently received Donald Trump's endorsement, and Gentner Drummond. Because Walters ch
Summary The probability of Matt Pinnell becoming the Republican nominee for Governor in Oklahoma is currently absolute zero. This assessment rests entirely on the fact that Pinnell did not officially file to run for the office. With the June 16 primary election just days away from today's date of June 10, 2026, the official filing deadlines have long passed and the ballots are completely finalized. Because he did not submit the required legal paperwork to contest the race, it is procedurally and
Summary The 2% probability that Chip Keating will secure the 2026 Republican nomination for Governor of Oklahoma reflects his status as a distinct longshot in a crowded field currently dominated by two clear frontrunners. The race's dynamics were significantly altered on May 29 when Donald Trump officially endorsed Mike Mazzei. In deeply conservative Oklahoma, a Trump endorsement is an exceptionally powerful asset, immediately elevating Mazzei to the status of heavy favorite. Recent polling cond
Summary The Republican nomination for Governor in South Dakota has come down to a July 28, 2026 runoff between Toby Doeden and Larry Rhoden. The race is currently viewed as a statistical tie, with Rhoden holding a 48% chance of securing the nomination against Doeden's 52%. Doeden holds the initial advantage of having won a plurality of votes in the June primary, securing approximately 31% to Rhoden's 25%. Doeden benefits significantly from his outsider, anti-establishment appeal and possesses a
Summary The June 16, 2026 Alabama Republican Senate runoff is highly competitive, though Jared Hudson faces an uphill battle with an estimated 31% chance of securing the nomination against Barry Moore, who holds a 69% probability. Moore possesses substantial structural advantages that make him the clear favorite, most notably his decisive performance in the initial primary round where he secured a 39% to 26% lead over Hudson. Furthermore, Moore benefits from entrenched institutional backing and
Summary The Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate in Michigan has narrowed to a competitive three-way race between Abdul El-Sayed (58%), Haley Stevens (31%), and Mallory McMorrow (11%). McMorrow enters the final stretch as the distinct underdog. The primary dynamic currently favors El-Sayed, who benefits from a consolidated progressive base while the moderate and establishment votes are split between Stevens and McMorrow. Within that moderate lane, Stevens has established a clear advantage. She
Summary The probability of Sarah Anthony becoming the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Michigan is effectively zero because she is simply not a candidate in this race. The Democratic primary has firmly solidified into an exclusive three-way contest among Abdul El-Sayed (estimated at 58% probability), Haley Stevens (31%), and Mallory McMorrow (11%). As of June 2026, the campaign dynamics, current polling, and major financial expenditures are entirely focused on these three active campaigns. T
Summary The probability of Dana Nessel becoming the Democratic nominee for the US Senate in Michigan is exactly zero because she is not a candidate in the race. The primary contest has fully crystallized into an exclusive three-way battle among Abdul El-Sayed (58%), Haley Stevens (31%), and Mallory McMorrow (11%). These active candidates are currently dominating all polling, fundraising, and campaign infrastructure. The competitive dynamics of the race are entirely focused on El-Sayed's structur
Summary Kristen McDonald Rivet is not running for the Democratic nomination for the US Senate in Michigan. The race is universally recognized as an exclusively three-way contest among Abdul El-Sayed (58%), Haley Stevens (31%), and Mallory McMorrow (11%). Because McDonald Rivet is not an active candidate and has shown no indication of entering the race, her probability of securing the nomination is zero. All available polling, campaign finance data, and political analysis focus entirely on the ac
Summary Haley Stevens has a 31% probability of becoming the Democratic nominee for the US Senate in Michigan, reflecting her position as a highly competitive contender in what is effectively a three-way race. The primary has narrowed to a contest among Abdul El-Sayed, who remains the frontrunner at 58%, Stevens at 31%, and Mallory McMorrow at 11%. All other potential candidates are not actively competing and have a 0% chance. Stevens faces a significant structural hurdle in this race: she and Mc
Summary The probability that Andy Levin will be the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Michigan is effectively zero, as he is not an active candidate in this primary race. The current Democratic primary is exclusively a competitive three-way contest between Abdul El-Sayed, Haley Stevens, and Mallory McMorrow. El-Sayed currently holds the lead as the progressive frontrunner, benefiting from the moderate vote being split between Stevens and McMorrow. Meanwhile, Stevens has gained substantial mom
Summary The Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate in Michigan is a highly competitive, strictly three-way contest, leaving no room for undeclared candidates to secure the nomination. The actual race is entirely focused on Abdul El-Sayed, Haley Stevens, and Mallory McMorrow. El-Sayed currently holds a structural advantage and a slight polling lead, though the race remains exceptionally tight due to moderate vote splitting between his opponents and a massive influx of outside spending backing Ste
Summary The probability of Rashida Tlaib becoming the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Michigan is exactly zero because she is not a candidate in the race. The primary contest has exclusively developed into a highly competitive, three-way race between Abdul El-Sayed, Haley Stevens, and Mallory McMorrow. Current political analysis and polling universally acknowledge these three as the only active contenders. The dynamics of the primary have completely solidified around these established campa
Summary The probability of the maximum WTI front-month settle price reaching $115.01 by December 31, 2026, is assessed at 54%. In April 2026, WTI prices peaked around $112-$113 per barrel, bringing the market within just a few dollars of this threshold. The current pricing environment is primarily driven by intense geopolitical tensions, specifically an ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Because prices have already climbed so close to the $115.01 mark, even a brief, minor escalation or a te
Summary WTI crude oil prices have experienced significant volatility throughout the first half of 2026, heavily driven by the ongoing geopolitical crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. The maximum front-month settle price year-to-date stands at approximately $112 to $113, recorded in April. Reaching the $120.01 threshold requires an additional price increase of roughly 6% to 7% from the year's established high. The probability of crossing this $120.01 mark by the end of the year is assessed at 46%. Th
Summary The probability of WTI crude reaching a maximum front-month settle price of $125.01 or above by the end of 2026 is estimated at 39%. This assessment reflects a significant geopolitical risk premium balanced against natural market ceilings. Thus far in 2026, WTI peaked around $112 to $113 in April, driven largely by the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Because prices have already approached this threshold, $125 remains a highly realistic target if the conflict escalates further. The market
Summary The probability that the maximum WTI front-month settle price will reach or exceed $130.01 by the end of 2026 is currently assessed at 33%. The market is experiencing a bimodal risk environment heavily dictated by geopolitical tensions. Earlier in 2026, the Strait of Hormuz crisis drove the front-month settle price to a peak of roughly $112-$113. While a breach of $130 remains plausible if the crisis sharply escalates, it represents a significantly higher barrier than the $115 to $125 le
Summary The highest front-month settle price for WTI so far in 2026 peaked around $112 to $113 in April. Currently, the market is driven heavily by geopolitical tensions, creating a bimodal outlook for crude prices. If the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz de-escalates, prices are expected to retreat to a baseline of $60 to $80 per barrel. Conversely, further escalation could push prices significantly higher. However, reaching the $140.01 threshold is a severe tail-risk scenario. A price of
Summary The current probability of 16% that WTI crude oil front-month settle prices will hit $150.01 by the end of 2026 reflects a delicate balance between extreme geopolitical risk and structural market headwinds. Thus far in 2026, WTI prices peaked around $112 to $113 in April, driven largely by the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. The market faces a highly bimodal distribution: a peaceful resolution or de-escalation would likely see prices plummet to the $60-$80 range, whereas an escal
Summary The probability of the maximum WTI front-month settle price reaching $160.01 or above by the end of 2026 is estimated at 11%. As of mid-2026, the maximum price reached earlier in the year peaked around $112 to $113, meaning a significant price surge is still required to breach this high threshold. The current oil market faces a distinctly bimodal distribution of potential outcomes driven by geopolitical events, specifically tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. In a scenario where t
Summary The probability of the WTI front-month settle price reaching $180.01 or above by December 31, 2026, is estimated at 6%. As of mid-2026, WTI prices peaked around $112-$113 in April, meaning significant upward momentum is still required to breach lower thresholds, let alone $180. The current price landscape is heavily driven by a bimodal geopolitical environment. A de-escalation of tensions, particularly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, would likely see prices retreat toward the $60-$80 ra
Summary The probability of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil reaching a front-month settle price of $200.01 or above by December 31, 2026, is estimated at just 4%. As of June 2026, the market has experienced significant volatility driven by the Strait of Hormuz crisis, with WTI peaking around $112-$113 in April. While the potential for further escalation in the Middle East poses upside risks, a surge to over $200 represents an extreme, unprecedented tail event. The all-time nominal high fo
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking an equity stake in TikTok US or ByteDance is estimated at a very low 5%. Recent government interventions involving equity stakes have been highly targeted, focusing on strategic national security sectors such as quantum computing (where companies like Rigetti, D-Wave, and GlobalFoundries are receiving minority investments) and ongoing negotiations with domestic AI and drone manufacturers. TikTok US operates in the consumer social media
Summary As of June 2026, the likelihood of the United States federal government taking an equity stake of above 0% in OpenAI's for-profit operating entity stands at 39%. This assessment is driven by recent shifts in US industrial policy and ongoing active negotiations between the government and OpenAI. In May 2026, the US Commerce Department established a definitive precedent for federal equity investments in strategic commercial technologies by issuing Letters of Intent for a $2 billion quantum
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking an equity stake in Anduril by January 1, 2027, is currently assessed at 22%. While the federal government has recently shown an increased willingness to take minority equity stakes in strategic technology firms—evidenced by the May 2026 Commerce Department Letters of Intent involving a $2 billion quantum computing package for companies like Rigetti, D-Wave, and GlobalFoundries—there is currently no explicit public indication that Anduri
Summary As of June 2026, there is a low probability (14%) that the US federal government will take an equity stake in Palantir. The US government has recently demonstrated a willingness to take minority equity stakes in critical technology companies, as seen in the May 2026 Commerce Department Letters of Intent involving a $2 billion quantum computing package affecting Rigetti, D-Wave, and GlobalFoundries, as well as ongoing negotiations with drone manufacturers and AI firms like OpenAI. However
Summary The probability of the U.S. federal government taking an equity stake in TSMC stands at a low 6%. Recent developments in U.S. industrial policy, particularly the Commerce Department's May 2026 $2 billion quantum computing package, have demonstrated a willingness to take minority equity stakes in critical technology companies like GlobalFoundries, Rigetti, and D-Wave. However, the situation for TSMC is markedly different. Explicit statements and current reporting indicate that TSMC is not
Summary The 7% probability reflects the extreme unlikelihood of the US government taking an equity stake in Nvidia by early 2027. Recent federal strategy, such as the May 2026 Commerce Department Letters of Intent for a $2B quantum computing package, demonstrates a willingness to take minority equity stakes in emerging, capital-intensive sectors (e.g., Rigetti, D-Wave) or critical domestic foundries (e.g., GlobalFoundries). Similarly, the government is engaged in active negotiations with smaller
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking an equity stake in Micron before January 1, 2027, is assessed at 12%. Recent initiatives by the Commerce Department have demonstrated a willingness to take minority equity stakes in critical technology firms, most notably seen in the May 2026 letters of intent for a $2 billion quantum computing package involving companies like GlobalFoundries. However, the landscape for semiconductor memory giant Micron appears fundamentally different.
Summary The probability of the United States federal government taking an equity stake in GlobalFoundries stands at a high 82%. This assessment is heavily driven by recent federal actions, specifically the May 2026 Commerce Department Letters of Intent. These documents outlined a $2 billion quantum computing and advanced technology package that explicitly includes GlobalFoundries, alongside other key firms like Rigetti and D-Wave. Crucially, this funding package is structured to include minority
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking an equity stake in Lockheed Martin by January 2027 is low, estimated at 8%. While the federal government is currently pursuing minority equity stakes in critical technology sectors—evidenced by a May 2026 Commerce Department $2B package targeting quantum computing and semiconductor firms like Rigetti, D-Wave, and GlobalFoundries—this strategy does not currently extend to traditional defense giants. Current reporting and official stateme
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking an equity stake of above 0% in Boeing by the resolution date is assessed at a highly improbable 8%. Recent federal initiatives regarding government equity stakes—most notably the May 2026 Commerce Department packages—have overwhelmingly targeted emerging and early-stage critical technologies. The government is actively negotiating minority stakes in sectors like quantum computing, commercial drones, and artificial intelligence, rather t
Summary IonQ is a prominent player in the quantum computing industry, a sector currently receiving substantial attention and direct funding from the United States federal government. In May 2026, the Commerce Department issued Letters of Intent for a $2 billion quantum computing package that explicitly included minority equity stakes in several of IonQ's direct competitors, namely Rigetti Computing and D-Wave Quantum (which respectively command 85% and 83% probabilities for government stakes). D
Summary The probability of the United States federal government taking a stake in Rigetti Computing is assessed at 85%. This high likelihood is driven primarily by recent, concrete actions from the federal government aimed at bolstering domestic capabilities in critical technologies. In May 2026, the Commerce Department issued Letters of Intent for a comprehensive $2 billion quantum computing package, which explicitly included Rigetti alongside other key industry players. Crucially, the terms of
Summary In May 2026, the US Commerce Department issued Letters of Intent to include D-Wave Quantum, alongside Rigetti Computing and GlobalFoundries, in a $2 billion critical technology funding package. Crucially, this initiative explicitly incorporates minority equity stakes for the federal government. Because formal Letters of Intent have already been signed and D-Wave is directly named in this strategic package, the likelihood of a finalized equity agreement is exceptionally high. The United S
Summary The US federal government is currently pursuing a targeted strategy of acquiring minority equity stakes in critical technology sectors, specifically quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and drone manufacturing. A May 2026 Commerce Department $2B quantum computing package explicitly outlined Letters of Intent for equity in select quantum and semiconductor firms, while active negotiations are underway for select AI and drone startups. Freeport-McMoRan, a major mining company, falls
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking a stake in Eli Lilly is extremely low, assessed at 5%. Current federal initiatives involving equity stakes are highly concentrated in emerging technology and national security sectors. Recent Commerce Department activity, for example, features a $2 billion package explicitly targeting quantum computing firms, while active negotiations are primarily focused on artificial intelligence companies and domestic drone manufacturers. There is a
Summary The probability of the United States federal government taking an equity stake in Pfizer by early 2027 is exceptionally low, assessed at just 4%. The current federal strategy for acquiring corporate equity is highly targeted, focusing strictly on critical national security technologies and emerging tech sectors. Active negotiations and recently signed Letters of Intent from the Commerce Department are concentrated in quantum computing, artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing
Summary The probability of the US federal government taking a stake in Spirit Airlines is extremely low, assessed at 4%. Recent federal initiatives involving government equity stakes are distinctly concentrated in strategic technology sectors, particularly quantum computing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and drone manufacturing. Companies in these critical areas are the primary targets for federal minority equity stakes, with the government allocating significant funds to secure natio
Summary The US federal government is actively exploring the possibility of taking equity stakes in domestic technology and defense-adjacent companies. As of mid-2026, drone manufacturers have become a specific area of focus to bolster domestic supply chains and reduce reliance on foreign-made systems. Performance Drone Works (PDW) is among the drone companies—alongside Unusual Machines (41%) and Neros Technologies (44%)—currently in active negotiations with the federal government regarding poten
Summary The US federal government is actively evaluating minority equity stakes in critical technology sectors, specifically focusing on quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and domestic drone manufacturing. Unusual Machines (UMAC) falls squarely into the drone category, alongside peers like Performance Drone Works (PDW) and Neros Technologies (NTEC). Current reporting as of June 2026 indicates that active negotiations are underway between the government and these drone manufacturers rega
Summary The probability that the United States federal government will take an equity stake of above 0% in Neros Technologies is estimated at 44%. Currently, active negotiations are underway between the federal government and several domestic drone companies, including Neros Technologies, Performance Drone Works, and Unusual Machines. These talks suggest a significant and deliberate effort by the government to secure a vested interest in the domestic drone manufacturing and defense technology ba
Summary Human New World screwworm (NWS) cases are extremely rare in the United States, with zero cases reported so far in 2026 (as of June 10). However, the recent detection of animal cases in Texas and New Mexico, combined with a large, ongoing outbreak in Central America and Mexico, creates a realistic risk for at least one travel-associated or locally acquired human case this year. The probability for more than zero cases is assessed at 41%. This reflects a careful balance between the escalat
Summary The probability of observing more than 1 human New World screwworm (NWS) case in the United States during 2026 is estimated at 24%. While human NWS cases in the US are historically exceedingly rare, the current context warrants a slightly elevated risk profile. There is a large ongoing outbreak of NWS in Central America and Mexico, and recent animal cases have been detected in US border states like Texas and New Mexico. This proximity increases the baseline risk for both travel-associate
Summary Human New World screwworm (NWS) infestations are exceptionally rare in the United States. As of June 10, 2026, there have been zero reported human cases. However, recent detections of animal cases in Texas and New Mexico, alongside a significant ongoing outbreak in Central America and Mexico, elevate the risk of cross-border spread and localized transmission. While the probability of seeing at least one human case is notable (41%), the likelihood drops sharply to 16% for exceeding two ca
Summary As of June 10, 2026, there are zero reported human cases of New World screwworm (NWS) in the United States. While there is a realistic chance of seeing at least one human case this year (estimated at 41%), the probability of observing more than three cases remains low at 12%. NWS is overwhelmingly an animal disease, and human infestations are historically exceedingly rare in the US. The current risk is elevated due to recent animal case detections in Texas and New Mexico, alongside a mas
Summary The probability of observing more than 5 human New World screwworm (NWS) cases in the United States during 2026 is estimated at 8%. While there is an ongoing and expanding outbreak of NWS among animals in Central America, Mexico, and recent border states like Texas and New Mexico, human cases of NWS are historically exceptionally rare. As of June 10, 2026, there have been zero reported human cases in the United States. While the spillover of the agricultural outbreak across the border el
Summary Graham Platner is nearly certain to be the Democratic nominee after securing the June primary, leaving only a minor residual risk (roughly 2-3%) that he withdraws before the July replacement deadline due to his ongoing scandals. If he remains the nominee, the general election against incumbent Republican Susan Collins will be fiercely competitive. Currently, Platner holds a modest polling lead, which gives a Democratic victory a slight edge (assessed at 55%). However, a Republican victor
Summary The probability of a federal gasoline excise tax suspension or reduction becoming law before July 1, 2026, is exceedingly low, estimated at 2%. With the deadline merely three weeks away, any legislation would need to move through the House, Senate, and reach the President's desk at an unprecedented pace. Currently, relevant bills remain stalled in committee, showing no signs of imminent advancement. Furthermore, the political and economic urgency that typically drives such drastic measur
Summary The probability of the United States having at least 4,400 data centers listed by the end of 2026 is exceptionally high, standing at 97%. This high confidence is rooted in the current trajectory of US data center listings on the Data Center Map directory and the broader expansion of data infrastructure driven by artificial intelligence and cloud computing. Between January and June 2026, the directory has seen an average growth rate of roughly 70 to 90 new listings per month. While there
Summary The likelihood of the United States having at least 4,500 data centers listed by the end of 2026 is extremely high, evaluated at 93%. Currently, the trajectory of US data center listings indicates robust, continued growth driven heavily by the ongoing artificial intelligence and cloud computing boom. From January to June 2026, the growth rate averaged roughly 70 to 90 new listings per month. Although recent weeks have seen a slight moderation to approximately 60 new listings per month, e
Summary The trajectory of U.S. data center listings on Data Center Map indicates continued robust growth through the end of 2026. The explosive demand for artificial intelligence and cloud computing infrastructure is driving a massive boom in physical data center construction and expansion, which is steadily reflecting in directory numbers. From January to June 2026, the growth rate of listings has averaged between 70 and 90 new facilities per month. While the pace of additions in recent weeks s
Summary The trajectory of US data center listings on Data Center Map indicates continued robust growth through the end of 2026, driven by an overarching boom in artificial intelligence and cloud computing infrastructure. From January to June of this year, the growth rate of data center listings has averaged an impressive 70 to 90 new facilities per month. Although recent weeks have suggested a slight moderation to approximately 60 additions per month, the foundational momentum of the industry re
Summary The race for the Democratic nomination in New York's 13th Congressional District has coalesced into a highly competitive, two-person contest between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and primary challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. While the race appears exceptionally tight, Espaillat holds a very slight edge based on the fundamental advantages of incumbency, strong institutional support, and recent shifts in the campaign's momentum. As the incumbent, Espaillat enjoys a signifi
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District is universally recognized as a highly competitive, two-person race between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. Analysis of the race's fundamental dynamics, institutional endorsements, and polling data indicates that all other candidates—including Oscar Romero—have negligible or virtually zero chance of securing the nomination. Espaillat benefits from strong institutional bac
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District is exclusively a two-person contest between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. The broader dynamics of the race are entirely consumed by these two frontrunners, who together account for virtually all of the viability in the primary (estimated at a combined 99% probability). Espaillat holds vast institutional support—including backing from Governor Kathy Hochul, Attorney Gen
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District has evolved into a highly competitive, two-person race between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. The established consensus is that all other candidates, including Jaliel Amador, have negligible or completely nonexistent chances of securing the nomination, with several having already withdrawn or failed to qualify. The core dynamics of the race revolve entirely around Espai
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District has consolidated entirely into a highly competitive, two-person race between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and insurgent challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. The overall picture of this election features Espaillat relying on his significant incumbency advantages, substantial financial resources, and widespread institutional backing from prominent figures like Governor Kathy Hochul, Attorney General Letitia Ja
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District is universally recognized as a highly competitive, two-person race between incumbent Representative Adriano Espaillat and challenger Darializa Avila Chevalier. All other candidates have either withdrawn, been disqualified, or have failed to generate any meaningful campaign infrastructure or support, leaving them with negligible to zero chances of securing the nomination. Matt Miller is entirely absent from any serious disc
Summary The Democratic primary for New York's 13th Congressional District is universally understood to be a highly competitive, two-person race between the incumbent, Representative Adriano Espaillat, and his principal challenger, Darializa Avila Chevalier. The race has coalesced entirely around these two frontrunners, leaving no viable path for any other contender. Representative Espaillat benefits from the substantial inherent advantages of incumbency, including a significant fundraising lead