Which leaders will leave office in 2026? [Subquestion: Miguel Díaz-Canel]

probability: 40%

rationale:

This assessment specifically focuses on Miguel Díaz-Canel departing as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), rather than merely the presidency pcc.cu pcc.cu. Historically, the top Party post is the most entrenched and 'sticky' position. A face-saving transition where he cedes the presidency while temporarily retaining the First Secretary post to oversee the regime's stabilization (mirroring Raúl Castro's strategy in 2018) would not constitute leaving office under these parameters.

Structural factors weigh heavily against an immediate, complete departure. Procedurally, the primary mechanism for succession—the 9th Party Congress, originally scheduled for April 2026—was indefinitely postponed to dedicate the year to economic recovery pcc.cu swissinfo.ch. This effectively removes the scheduled internal mechanism for leadership change before 2027. Furthermore, Díaz-Canel has taken a defiant public stance, recently stating 'stepping down is not part of our vocabulary' nbcnews.com, and the Cuban government has formally refused to negotiate the positions of its officials reuters.com. At the extraordinary party and government sessions in mid-June 2026, Díaz-Canel firmly presided over the rollout of new economic reform packages, with no indications of a leadership transition apnews.com reuters.com presidencia.gob.cu.

However, there remains a substantial risk of forced departure or negotiated exit driven by an acute and unprecedented domestic crisis. The Cuban state is grappling with 20–22 hour blackouts, critical fuel depletion, and large-scale protests reuters.com. Compounding this vulnerability is a severe U.S. pressure campaign explicitly aimed at forcing his removal: the U.S. has targeted Díaz-Canel and his family with new OFAC designations ofac.treasury.gov, indicted Raúl Castro reuters.com, and made Díaz-Canel's exit a stated goal of ongoing back-channel negotiations apnews.com reuters.com whitehouse.gov. If domestic stability collapses further, it is procedurally possible for the Central Committee to convene a plenum to replace him without waiting for a full Party Congress pcc.cu, effectively sacrificing him as a figurehead to secure sanctions relief or quell unrest.

Ultimately, while the domestic crisis and U.S. coercion pose severe threats to his tenure, the party-state is structurally designed to resist foreign demands. Given the postponement of the Party Congress and the specific requirement that he vacate the top Party role rather than just the state presidency, a complete departure before 2027 remains a minority, though highly substantive, risk.