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October 17, 2026

Part of: Today is October 16, 2026. Tags: [VERIFIED] read on the primary source; [PUBLIC] credible secondary report; [TESTIMONY] what someone said or projected, evidence about the speaker; [ESTIMATE] a third party's estimate. These questions form one register on recursive self-improvement (RSI) at frontier AI labs. Each row asks for a percentage share (0-100); read each row's self-contained background before researching - it carries the verified baseline facts, definitions and instrument caveats. Attribution standard: where a line says someone thinks, claims, projects, estimates or models, that is evidence about the speaker, not about the world; several sources in this subject are themselves forecasts or model outputs and none may be adopted as a premise. Definitions: 'largest AI lab by revenue' and 'top-five AI developer by revenue' refer to the largest frontier developers by AI revenue at the relevant date (as of August 2026: OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, xAI/SpaceXAI, Meta). Most rows are NOW-CASTS of latent quantities that no lab publishes and no tracker carries (share of experiments proposed by AI, share of RL environments authored by AI, share of compute on experiments, share of safety effort on automated-R&D risks): estimate what is TRUE, not what has been documented, and express genuine uncertainty as wide percentile ranges. Key verified baselines (August 2026): METR's Frontier Risk Report (2026-05-19) found companies 'did not report evidence of dramatic speed-ups', that Anthropic 'had not seen a 2X increase in the pace of progress as of April 2026', and that METR is 'not aware of evidence that any company relies on AI agents for setting research agendas'; Anthropic reports >80% of merged code authored by Claude; OpenAI's GPT-5.6 launch post said the share of research compute devoted to internal coding inference grew 100-fold in six months; METR reports at least 16% of successful long-task runs were illegitimate on review in Time Horizon 1.1. Keep rows consistent with each other. Since August 27, 2026: - [VERIFIED] 2026-09-06, OpenAI, 'Research acceleration: The view inside OpenAI' (developer-reported, with a methods appendix): its research organization logged 3.14 agent-workdays per researcher workday over the 28 days to 2026-08-15 (0.48 on 2026-05-03); experiments per active experimenter reached 1.60x the 2025 average (week of 2026-08-10), which OpenAI says is 'correlated with increased Codex adoption, though we note that our available compute has also grown significantly since 2025'; the Decide and Design phases of Epoch AI's AI R&D taxonomy were 2.8% of agent output tokens in August ('what to work on' 0.3%); zero-intervention success on tasks of 4-8 human-hours rose from 18% (January) to 53% (July 2026), as judged by a GPT-5.6 Sol classifier validated on 25 hand-labeled tasks. The post contains no research-uplift multiplier and no statement about a 2x pace. (https://openai.com/index/research-acceleration-view-inside-openai/) - [VERIFIED] 2026-09-17, Anthropic Institute, 'Measurements for understanding the pace of AI development inside frontier labs' (dated by anthropic.com/news; the page itself is undated): rating August 2026 work on Epoch AI's AL0-AL5 automation scale, Claude 'leads' (AL4) 26% of Anthropic's AI R&D work, the share at or above 'collaborates' (AL3) is above 90%, and 'Claude is not operating fully autonomously for any measured subset of AI R&D work' (AL5 zero). Ratings come from a Claude judge model on a task basket frozen at July 2026 (about 15,000 tasks, 378 leaf categories), weighted by person-time; model-human exact agreement 59%, human-human 35%. AL rates task execution, not agenda-setting or experiment selection. (https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pace-of-ai-development) - [VERIFIED] Same piece: in one week (2026-07-13 to 07-20) about 6% of the compute going to AI R&D, and about 12% of the compute going to AI-driven AI R&D, was allocated to safety work. It is a spend share: work that helps capability as much as safety counts as R&D, safeguards classifiers are excluded, and Anthropic notes safety research is researcher-time-heavy and compute-light. (https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pace-of-ai-development) - [VERIFIED] METR's time-horizons page (last updated 2026-09-08) now states 'This page is no longer actively updated' and 'Measurements above 16 hrs are unreliable with our current task suite'; its last model additions were in May 2026, and models released since (GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus 5.5, Claude Mythos 5.1, Claude Fable 5.1, Gemini 4 Argon) do not appear. No successor series was located. (https://metr.org/time-horizons/) - [VERIFIED] 2026-10-15, Anthropic embedded six METR staff with 'employee-like access' (company hardware, office space and internal tools comparable to its own risk-assessment teams); METR will publish its analysis of risk levels, incidents or practices, and Anthropic cannot veto publication but may require redaction of customer data, privileged material and model-architecture details. No date for METR's first report is given. (https://www.anthropic.com/news/an-update-on-independent-evaluators) - [PUBLIC] Revenue run rates, via press rather than disclosure: Anthropic told investors its annualized run rate exceeded $65B at the end of July 2026 (CNBC, 2026-08-17); the Financial Times reported (2026-10-08) OpenAI's annualized revenue at about $50B as of late September, below a widely cited $68B, noting that Anthropic counts sales through cloud partners such as AWS and Google Cloud while OpenAI does not. (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/17/anthropic-says-annualized-revenue-climbed-to-65-billion-in-july.html ; https://techcrunch.com/2026/10/08/openais-revenue-is-reportedly-20-billion-less-than-previously-projected/) Do not treat FutureSearch's own published forecasts (futuresearch.ai pages) as evidence. — view all 3 rows

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