probability: 25%

rationale:

As of July 3, 2026, the probability of a ceasefire, peace agreement, or durable de facto end to active hostilities by December 31 stands at 25%. While mounting military and economic exhaustion on both sides provides some structural pressure for a settlement, fundamental incompatibilities in negotiating positions and recent escalations make a lasting halt to fighting by year-end a minority prospect.

Escalation and Incompatible Demands The conflict remains highly active and escalatory. On Jul

probability: 51%

rationale:

As of July 2026, the probability of an end to active hostilities by December 2027 sits at a coin flip (51%). While the broad resolution criteria—allowing for a ceasefire, peace agreement, or de facto end of fighting—meaningfully raise the likelihood above that of a strict official peace treaty, entrenched political demands and a history of failed truces limit confidence in a durable halt.

Drivers Toward a Resolution A primary driver toward a de facto end of fighting is mutual exhaustion and

probability: 67%

rationale:

I assess a 67% probability that Russia and Ukraine will end active hostilities by December 31, 2028. This estimate balances the compounding structural constraints pushing both sides toward military exhaustion against the immense political and practical hurdles of cementing a durable end to the fighting.

The primary driver for a cessation of hostilities is mutual exhaustion over the 2.5-year horizon. As of mid-2026, the battlefield reflects an attritional stalemate. Russia has been advancing at

probability: 75%

rationale:

I assess a 75% probability that active hostilities will end by December 31, 2029. This estimate is primarily driven by the long 3.5-year time horizon and the broad resolution criteria—which allow for a ceasefire, armistice, or a de facto freeze to qualify—balanced against the structurally incompatible political demands of both sides that keep the conflict intensely active today.

The strongest factor favoring resolution by the 2029 deadline is mutual exhaustion and accumulating resource constrai

probability: 75%

rationale:

A 75% probability reflects the strong structural pressures forcing an eventual cessation of hostilities over the 4.5-year window to December 2030, balanced against the risk that fighting devolves into an entrenched, indefinite low-intensity conflict.

Structural Pressures and Broad Criteria The primary driver for a resolution is the sheer length of the time horizon combined with the broad criteria, which count a ceasefire, peace agreement, or even a de facto end of fighting. By the end of 20

probability: 83%

rationale:

As of July 2026, the Russia-Ukraine war remains actively ongoing in its fifth year. Recent diplomatic efforts, including US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi and Geneva, have failed to produce a breakthrough en.wikipedia.org legis1.com. Russia maintains maximalist demands—requiring Ukrainian withdrawal from four illegally annexed oblasts, strict military limits, and an abandonment of NATO aspirations understandingwar.org apnews.com reuters.com. Ukraine refuses capitulation and demands firm security guarantees before agreeing to

probability: 85%

rationale:

An 85% probability reflects the overwhelming structural pressures of a long time horizon against mounting mutual exhaustion, slightly offset by the risk of a perpetual, low-intensity conflict.

The resolution criteria are highly generous, encompassing not just a formal peace agreement but also a ceasefire or a "de facto end of fighting." By December 2032, the full-scale invasion will have lasted nearly 11 years—an exceptionally long duration for a high-intensity interstate conflict. Severe resou

probability: 85%

rationale:

An 85% probability reflects the overwhelming likelihood that material exhaustion and historical base rates will force at least a de facto end to fighting over the next 7.5 years, despite the current intensity of the conflict.

As of July 2026, hostilities are highly active and a near-term diplomatic breakthrough appears remote. Ongoing strikes, such as the deadly July 2 Russian missile and drone barrage on Kyiv reuters.com and continued cross-border drone exchanges reuters.comreuters.comunderstandingwar.org, highlig

probability: 87%

rationale:

The 87% probability is driven by the stark contrast between near-term intractability and the overwhelming long-term structural factors that favor a cessation of hostilities by 2034.

In the near term, the conflict remains highly intense and prospects for an immediate breakthrough are poor reuters.com. Russia maintains maximalist conditions, requiring Ukrainian withdrawal from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, and insists that any talks reflect the "reality on the ground"

probability: 91%

rationale:

The assessment of a 91% probability is driven primarily by the broad resolution criteria—a ceasefire, peace agreement, or de facto end of fighting—combined with an exceptionally long time horizon extending to December 31, 2035. BASE RATES AND TIME HORIZON: Continuous, high-intensity interstate war lasting approximately 14 years (from February 2022 to the end of 2035) is historically extremely rare. Using UCDP data, evidence suggests that 66% of interstate wars end in compromise, stalemate, cease

probability: 90%

rationale:

The 90% probability reflects the overwhelming likelihood that extreme mutual exhaustion and historical base rates will force at least a temporary ceasefire, peace agreement, or de facto freeze within the broad 10.5-year window remaining until December 31, 2036. As of July 2026, the war remains highly active and diplomatic tracks are deeply stalled. Russia occupies roughly 19-20% of Ukraine russiamatters.orgcsis.org, and violence is intense, with 1,890 political-violence events recorded in late June 2026