Summary The probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz exceeding 60 before September 1, 2026, is assessed at 28%. Given the recent halt in traffic, including an IRGC closure on June 6 resulting in zero transits over a recent 72-hour period, near-term normalization is highly unlikely. Peace talks remain stalled, meaning an immediate political resolution is not on the horizon. Even in the optimistic scenario where an agreement is reached quickly, the physical process of returning traffic to normal levels is fraught with delays. Operations such as mine-clearing will take an estimated 30 days, addressing insurance and security concerns will further stall operations, and clearing the massive backlog of approximately 1,500 stranded vessels will require substantial time. Collectively, these physical and political lag times introduce a 30 to 60+ day delay between a hypothetical peace deal and the 7-day moving average consistently crossing the high threshold of 60 transit calls. Additionally, the IMF PortWatch tracker tends to undercount dark ships (vessels operating with their Automatic Identification Systems turned off), which artificially suppresses the reported daily averages even as physical traffic resumes. Consequently, while there is a roughly one-in-four chance that a rapid political breakthrough and subsequent clearance operations could drive transit calls above 60 before September, the structural delays make this a relatively low-probability outcome.
Strongest Arguments for Yes • A sudden breakthrough in peace talks could occur if immense international and economic pressure forces a swift diplomatic resolution before late July. • Once a political agreement is reached, commercial operators are highly motivated to resume traffic quickly to clear the enormous backlog of 1,500 stranded ships, potentially causing a rapid spike in daily transits that pushes the 7-day moving average above 60. • International coalitions could expedite mine-clearing operations and provide immediate security guarantees, shortening the expected 30-day timeline for physical normalization.
Strongest Arguments for No • Peace talks are currently stalled, and the recent IRGC closure on June 6 indicates an escalation rather than a de-escalation of the conflict. • The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is near zero, requiring a massive and sustained increase in traffic to reach a moving average of 60. • Even with a rapid peace agreement, the physical logistics of clearing mines, addressing exorbitant insurance premiums, and securely moving 1,500 backlogged ships will realistically take 30 to 60+ days, pushing the recovery timeline well past September 1. • The IMF PortWatch tracker structurally undercounts vessels operating with AIS disabled, making the reported 60-call threshold much harder to reach even if actual traffic recovers somewhat.
Key Uncertainties • Timeline of a diplomatic breakthrough: If peace talks unexpectedly resume and conclude by early July, there might be just enough time to clear the Strait and reach the threshold before September. If talks remain stalled past mid-July, the September 1 deadline becomes virtually impossible to meet. • Speed of mine-clearing and security operations: The ability of international forces to clear the Strait faster than the estimated 30 days would significantly increase the chances of hitting the threshold. • Reporting metrics of the IMF PortWatch: Changes in how vessels report their AIS data, or adjustments by the IMF in tracking methodology, could either help or hinder the reported numbers reaching the target moving average.